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The past two decades have witnessed unprecedented attention to corporate
legal liability for human rights abuses. Yet the supporting jurisprudence is
relatively thin. Scholars generally agree that corporations can incur legal
liability for serious violations of international human rights law. But courts
find any number ofwcrys to avoid such a result. This Article finds qualified
supportfor an emergent norm ofcorporate civil liability from recent litigation
in Japan. Specifically, the transnational war reparations litigation ofthe past
three decades has yielded a consistent jurisprudence of qualified liability.
Courts detail the abuses committed by Japan 's largest multinational
corporations, andfind them illegal under applicable law. But they ultimately
avoid liability by accepting one or more affirmative defenses. These cases
provide legal theories that other jurisdictions mcry wish to consider in
reviewing corporate legal liability. It also informs debate about the ongoing
project of World War II reparations, and the relationship between states and
corporations in remediating human rights violations.

INTRODUCTION

Who is responsible for World War II? Who should pay for it? In weighing
the war's legacy on its seventy-fifth anniversary, we must account for recent
developments about war responsibility. In 2019, the United States Department of
State doubled reparations, to $400,000, for Holocaust survivors deported on French
trains to death camps in Eastern Europe. 1 Meanwhile, Poland passed its own "death
camp" law in 2018, criminalizing public attribution of World War II crimes to the
Polish state. 2 At the other end of Eurasia, relations between South Korea and Japan
hit their lowest point in half a century, after the South Korean Supreme Court ordered
two Japanese corporations to compensate Korean forced laborers for their wartime
service. 3 In 2016, another Japanese company, Mitsubishi Materials, established a
fund to compensate Chinese citizens who performed forced laborers during the war. 4
See Amy Held, Holocaust Survivors and Victims' Families Receive Millions in Reparations
from France, NPR (Feb. 8, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/02/07 /6923 76994/holocaust-survivors-and
victims-families-receive-millions-in-reparations-from-fr (describing the Holocaust Deportation Claims
Program, which compensates persons deported on the French national railway to concentration camps in
Eastern Europe).
See Rick Noack, Poland's controversial 'Holocaust Law' set to be reversed after global outcry,
WASHINGTON
POST
(June
27,
2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2018/06/27/polands-holocaust-law-caused-an
outcry-now-in-a-surprise-its-being-largely-reversed/ (noting the removal of prison terms from the law in
order to "soothe tensions with strategically important allies such as the United States and the European
Union").
3
Choe Sang-Hun & Motoko Rich, The $89,000 Verdict Tearing Japan and South Korea Apart,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 13, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/13/world/asia/south-korea-slave-forced
labor-japan-world-war-two.html (describing a pair of verdicts against Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, and
Nippon Steel & Sumitomo Metal); Song Jung-a & Kana Inagaki, Why Japan-South Korea relations have
soured, FIN. TIMES (Aug. 27, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/94ce2ldc-c584-1 Ie9-a8e9
296ca6651 lc9 (noting the current bilateral dispute stems from the Supreme Court decisions); Scott A.
Snyder, Why the Japan-South Korea Dispute Just Got Worse, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS IN
BRIEF (Aug. 27, 2019), https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/why-japan-south-korea-dispute-just-got-worse
(citing the dissolution of the comfort women agreement, and the Supreme Court decisions, as the main
factors in the deterioration of Japan-Korea ties).
See Austin Ramzy, Mitsubishi Apologizes to World War II Forced Laborers, N.Y. TIMES (June
2, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/02/world/asia/mitsubishi-china-ww2-apology.html. The
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Mitsubishi also issued a fulsome apology to former forced laborers-a rare form of
redress in Asia's war responsibility debate. 5
Ofparticular salience in these discussions is the extent to which corporations
are held accountable. Many multinational corporations in both Europe and Asia used
forced labor on an industrial scale during World War II. But only rarely do they
acknowledge their role, admit legal liability, or pay compensation. 6 These questions
of redress reflect a broader discussion about the whether corporations owe
obligations to society, and whether they incur legal liability when they do not fulfill
those obligations. At the international level, the United Nations has launched several
7
initiatives to prod companies to shoulder greater social responsibilities. These
efforts culminated in the UN Human Rights Council's Framework on Business and
Human Rights, also known as the "Ruggie Report,'' in recognition of Professor John
Ruggie, who led the initiative. 8 Yet the Ruggie Report ultimately refrained from
imposing legal liability on corporations, insisting instead that they "do no harm." 9
At the national level, courts in numerous jurisdictions question whether
corporations can incur legal responsibility for violating international human rights
law. In the United States, the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) has provided courts ample
opportunity to attach legal liability to multinational corporations engaged in human
rights abuses. 10 Scholars and lawyers have posited various theories of corporate
liability under the ATS. 11 But while the commentary has piled up, few judicial
year before, the same company's American subsidiary apologized to an American prisoner of war who
performed forced labor in 1944 and 1945. See Scott Neuman, Japan's Mitsubishi Apologizes for Using
US. POWs As Forced Labor in WWII, NPR (July 19, 2015), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo
way/20 l 5/07 /19/424408003/japans-mitsubishi-to-apologize-for-using-u-s-pows-as-laborers-in-wwii.
See Timothy Webster, The Price ofSettlement: World War II Reparations in China, Japan and
Korea, 51 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 301, 347, 372 (2019)) (hereinafter "Price of Settlement"). In this
analysis of settlement agreements between Japanese multinationals and forced laborers from Korea and
China, Japanese corporations apologized in two of six agreements. Id. at 347 (describing results of the
Korean settlements), 372 (describing the results of the Chinese settlements).
6
Leora Bilsky writes that the Euro-American reparations movement addressed the "unresolved
issue of the complicity of private corporations in facilitating systematic and gross violations of human
rights during the Holocaust." LEORA BILSKY, THE HOLOCAUST, CORPORATIONS AND THE LAW:
UNFINISHED BUSINESS 52 (2017). However, because the cases settle out of court, Bilsky writes that
"normative clarification of corporate liability has once again been eluded." Id. at 72.
The UN Global Compact provides ten principles by which a corporation can ensure respect for
human rights, labor, and environment, all the while avoiding corruption. Later, a UN group led by
Professor David Weissbrodt of the University of Minnesota produced a relatively stringent set of
standards for corporations. See U.N. Subcommission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights,
Draft Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with
regard to Human Rights, E/CN.4/Sub.2 (May 30, 2003). When corporations and interest groups publicly
opposed the Draft Norms, Secretary-General Kofi Annan appointed Harvard professor John Ruggie to
draw up a new, presumably laxer, set of principles. See John Ruggie (the Special Representative of the
Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business
enterprises), Business and human rights: mapping international standards of responsibility and
accountability for corporate acts, ii 22, AIHRC/4/35 (Feb. 19, 2007).
See H.R.C., Protect, Respect and Remedy: a Framework for Business and Human Rights,
AIHRC/8/5 (Apr. 7, 2008) (hereafter "Ruggie Report").
The Ruggie Report requires that corporations respect rights, which it defined as "not to infringe
on the rights of others - put simply, to do no harm." Id. at ii 24.
10
Sarei v. Rio Tinto, 487 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir. 2007); Doe v. Unocal, 395 F.3d 292 (9th Cir. 2002)
11
See, e.g., Chimene I. Keitner, Conceptualizing Complicity in Alien Tort Cases, 60 HASTINGS
L.J. 64, 66 (2009) (proposing a knowledge, as opposed to a purpose, requirement for corporate
accomplice liability); Alan Sykes, Corporate Liability for Extraterritorial Torts, 100 GEO. L.J. 2161,
2170--71 (2008) (differentiating primary liability, when the corporation acts as the primary wrongdoer,
from secondary liability, when it aids or abets state actors); Harold Hongju Koh, Separating Myth from
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opinions actually attach legal liability to corporations; in just one reported decision
has a federal court found a corporation liable. 12 Moreover, recent decisions by the
U.S. Supreme Court, including Jesner v. Arab Bank (2018), 13 augur a muted role for
the A TS in further developing norms of corporate liability. Civil litigation in Canada,
England, Germany and the Netherlands has also shielded corporations from liability
for a number of reasons. 14
What about Asia? A discussion of corporate civil liability that excludes the
largest continent ignores most of humanity; it also overlooks the location of
widespread abuses, in the past and the present. 15 Yet that is precisely what the Ruggie
Report does. 16 This Article fills in a piece of that continental gap by examining the
judicial construction of corporate legal liability in contemporary Japan. Specifically,
it reviews some two dozen lawsuits, brought by Korean and Chinese plaintiffs,
against Japanese corporations that used forced labor during World War II. 17 The

Reality abut Corporate Responsibility Litigation, 7 J. INT'L ECON. L. 263, 265-66 (2003) (arguing for
legal liability when corporations commitjus cogens violations, or conspire with a state to violate human
rights). But see Julian Ku, The Curious Case of Corporate Liability under the Alien Tort Statute: A
Flawed System ofJudicial Lawmaking, 51 VA. J. INT'L L. 353, 356, 395 (2010) (arguing that international
law does not support corporate legal liability, and criticizing American judges for assuming that it does).
12
See Donald Earl Childress III, The Alien Tort Statute, Federalism, and the Next Wave of
Transnational Litigation, 100 GEO. L.J. 709 (2011).
13
The Supreme Court has consistently narrowed the grounds upon which plaintiffs can seek
redress. In Sosa, the Court rejected a case alleging "arbitrary detention" because such a human rights
violation had not achieved the status of"specific, universal and obligatory" norm under international law.
Sosa v. Alvarez Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004). In Kiobel, the Supreme Court erected a presumption
against the extraterritorial application of federal law. Henceforth, claims would have to "touch and
concern" U.S. territory with "sufficient force" to overcome the presumption. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum, 569 U.S. 108 (2013). In Jesner, the Court categorically dismissed all ATS lawsuits filed
against foreign corporations. Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 584 U.S._, 138 S. Ct. 1386 (2018).
14
See Association Canadienne contre l'impunite v. Anvil Mining Ltd., 2012 QCCA 117 (Can.).
The appellate court dismissed a lawsuit against Canadian mining company for activities that took place
in the Democratic Republic of Congo due to the absence of a "real and substantial link" ("lien reel et
substantief') to Quebec. Id. at ii 93. See generally Jonas Grimheden, Civil Litigation in Response to
Corporate Human Rights Abuse: The European Union and Its Member States, 50 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L
L. 235, 238-240 (2018) (describing the dismissal of lawsuits filed against Shell in Amsterdam and
London, and against German clothier KiK in Dortmund).
15
A majority ofhumanity--4.6 of7.7 billion people-live in Asia.
16
The Ruggie Report mentions a few cases from Australia, the United States, the United Kingdom
and the European Court of Justice. Ruggie Report, supra 8, ii 90. Western scholarship has, with few
exceptions, overlooked the issue of corporate legal liability in Asia. One exception is Changrok Soh,
Extending Corporate Liability to Human Rights Violations in Asia, 20 J. INT'L & AREA STUD. 23, 28-30
(2013), who focuses on ATS lawsuits for human rights violation in Asia. The other major case involving
Asia involves the 1984 Bhopal industrial disaster in India, which led to a spate of lawsuits in both India
and the United States. The Supreme Court of India approved of a settlement in I 989, yet that amount of
money has proven insufficient to remediate the harm. Lawsuits to wring additional money from Union
Carbide or Dow, have been unsuccessful in the United States and India. See Union Carbide/Dow lawsuit
(re Bhopal), BUSINESS & HUMAN RIGHTS RESOURCE CENTRE, https://www.business
humanrights.org/en/union-carbidedow-lawsuit-re-bhopal (last visited May 21, 2020).
17
Corporate defendants include Mitsubishi Heavy Industry, Fujikoshi, Kajima Construction, New
Japan Steel, Mitsubishi Mining, Hazama Group, Furukawa Machinery and Metal, Tekken Construction,
Nishimatsu Construction, Ube Industries, Dowa Mining, Tobishima Construction, Japan Energy,
Mitsubishi Materials, Kumagai Group, Taisei Construction, Japan Nickel, Rinko Corporation, Mitsui
Mining, Sumitomo Coal and Mining, Chizaki Industry, Aoyama Trust, Sakeda Ports and Transportation,
and Nanao Land and Sea Transport. Plaintiffs won damages awards against corporations in just three
cases: Niigata Chiho Saibansho [Niigata Dist. Ct.] Mar. 26, 2004, ("Zhang Wenbin v. Rinko Corp.")
(ordering company to pay 88 million yen to ten forced laborers and two heirs of forced laborers), slip
opinion available at justice.skr.jp/judgements/63-1 .pdf; Hiroshima Koto Saibansho [Hiroshima H. Ct.]
July 9, 2004, 1865 HANREI JIH6 62 ("Song Jixiao v. Nishimatsu Construction Comp.") (ordering
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claims vary from case to case, but most plaintiffs demand monetary damages (unpaid
wages, tort liability) for forced labor they performed in Japan, while a few accuse the
corporation of forcible abduction as well. 18
Given the political sensitivities about underlying issue of war responsibility,
one might expect a fair degree of norm contestation among the courts. But with
minor exceptions, Japanese judges hew to a relatively uniform script regarding
contested facts, violations oflaw, potential compensation, and affirmative defenses.
The occasional judge refuses to find facts, or fails to hold a corporation under a
particular legal theory. 19 But over time, judges coalesced around a set configuration
After the Supreme Court of Japan dismissed multiple war
of law and facts.
reparations lawsuits in 2007, Japanese lower courts could no longer attach legal
liability. 20 In the wake of these rulings, Japanese courts have maintained that postwar
company to pay 27.5 million yen to five former forced laborers), slip opmwn available at
justice.skr.jp/judgements/54-2.pdf; Fukuoka Chiho Saibansho [Fukuoka Dist. Ct.] Apr. 26, 2002, 1098
HANREI TAIMUZU [HANTA] 267 "(Zhang Baoheng v. Mitsui Mining") (ordering company to pay 165
million yen to fifteen Chinese forced laborers), slip opinion available at justice.skr.jp/judgements/67
1.pdf.
18
The main contention against Japanese corporations is that they forced Chinese and Korean
citizens to perform "forced labor" (ky6sei r6d6) at their worksites in Japan. In addition, some plaintiffs
have also accused the corporation of participating in their abduction or "forced transportation" (ky6sei
renk6) from China or Korea respectively. See Osaka Chiho Saibansho [Osaka Dist. Ct.] Mar 27, 2001,
unpublished opinion ("Shin v. Ch'eon-su v. New Japan Steel and Japan") (dismissing claims against
corporation on alter ego theory, and finding that plaintiffs had not been abducted from Korea) (on file
with the Stanford Journal of International Law). Generally speaking, Japanese courts have been more
willing to recognize the fact that Chinese laborers were forcibly abducted, than Korean laborers. This is
explored in more detail below. See infra, Parts IA, 18.
19
Japanese judges largely acknowledged the fact of forced labor and forced transportation
(abduction) in the case of Chinese forced laborers case. See, e.g., Kyoto Chih6 Saibansho [Kyoto Dist.
Ct.] Jan. 15, 2003, 1822 HANREI m16 83 ("Liu Zonggen v. Nippon Yakin & Japan") (finding plaintiffs
were forcibly abducted from China, trafficked to Japan, and subjected to forced labor in a Japanese mine),
slip opinion available at justice.skr.jp/judgements/56-1.pdf. One trial court did not make factual
findings, in a case pitting forty-two plaintiffs against ten corporations. See Tokyo Chiho Saibansho
[Tokyo Dist. Ct.] Mar. 11, 2003, unpublished opinion ("Li Wanzhong v. Hazama Corp. et al."), slip
opinion available at justice.skr.jp/judgements/49-1.pdf. On appeal, however, the Tokyo High Court
made detailed factual findings. See Tokyo Koto Saibansho [Tokyo H. Ct.], Mar. 16, 2006, ("Li v.
Hazama"), unpublished opinion. Trial courts on occasion determined that Korean plaintiffs were not
forcibly conscripted; that is, they went to Japan voluntarily. See, e.g.,, Osaka Chiho Saibansho [Osaka
D. Ct.] Mar. 27, 2001, unpublished opinion, ("Shin Ch'eon-su v. New Japan Steel & Japan") (finding
plaintiffs were not forcibly conscripted, but did perform forced labor in Japan), slip opinion available at
justice.skr.jp/judgements/53-1.pdf. On at least one occasion, Japanese appellate courts made factual
findings that contravened trial court determinations about forcible conscription. See Nagoya Chiho
Saibansho [Nagoya D. Ct.], Feb. 24, 2005, 1210 HANREJ TAIMUZU [HANTA]l86 ("Park Hae-ok V.
Mitsubishi Heavy Ind. & Japan") (finding that Park was not forcibly conscripted), slip opinion available
at justice.skr.jp/judgements/59-1.pdf; a.ffed Nagoya Koto Saibansho [Nagoya H. Ct.] May 31, 2007,
1894 HANREI JJHO 44 (finding that Park was mobilized through treachery and force, not through
voluntary means), slip opinion available at justice.skr.jp/judgements/59-2.pdf.
20
On April 27, 2007, the Supreme Court of Japan dismissed four war reparations lawsuits: (1)
Saiko Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 27, 2007, 1969 HANREI JIHO 28 ("Hou Qiaolian v. Japan") (holding that
the Japan-China Joint Communique waived four Chinese "comfort women's" right to seek individual
compensation); (2) Saiko Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 27, 2007, ("Liu Lianren v. Japan") unpublished
opinion, ((holding that the Japan-China Joint Communique waived Chinese forced laborer's individual
claims to compensation); (3) Saiko Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 27, 2007, 1969 HANREI JIHO 31 ("Song
Jixiao v. Nishimatsu Construction Co.")(finding that the Japan-China Joint Communique waived Chinese
at
available
opinion
slip
reparations),
war
for
claims
laborers'
forced
at
available
translation
English
courts.go.jp/app/files/hanrei_jp/591/03459l_hanrei.pdf,
courts.go.jp/app/hanrei_en/detail?id=893; (4) Saiko Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 27, 2007, ("Zhang
Baoheng v. Mitsui Mining Co.") (holding that the Japan-China Joint Communique waived Chinese
forced laborers' right to seek compensation), unpublished opinion.
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treaties-between Japan and China, and between Japan and South Korea
extinguished plaintiffs' claims, and precluded the award of monetary damages. 21 But
courts also made detailed factual findings, devised theories of tort liability, and
allocated liability between state and corporate actors. The suits may not be
representative in the sense that they capture the full breadth of corporate liability
issues in contemporary Japan, or East Asia. 22 Instead, their importance lies in their
coherent contributions to discussions about World War II accountability and
corporate legal liability.
More specifically, this Article advances descriptive and prescriptive claims
about corporate legal liability in Japanese war reparations lawsuits. The descriptive
claim discerns the three dominant modes by which Japanese courts formulate
corporate legal liability for the use of wartime forced labor. These include
negligence, joint liability, and tort liability, as well as the possibility of compensatory
damages. These formulations in tum give rise to two prescriptive claims about the
significance of the decisions. First, taken as a whole, the lawsuits provide qualified
support for a norm of corporate legal liability. Second, the failure to hold
corporations legally liable does not completely vindicate them. Japanese judges
carefully depict the role of Japanese corporations in each phase of the forced labor
apparatus: their initial requests for forced labor from the Japanese Cabinet, their
recruitment and trafficking Korean and Chinese forced laborers, the brutal treatment
to which they subjected forced laborers, and the postwar denials some corporations
have made about their participation in the forced labor program. These findings bear
reputational, moral, financial, and political consequences, even if legal liability does
not attach.
This Article makes three contributions to the literature. First, it informs
ongoing debates about corporate civil liability, mining uncharted jurisprudence to
extend the discussion beyond its Anglophone and common law borders. Few of the
decisions herein discussed have attracted scholarly discussion in English, 23 even as
21
Japanese courts dismissed cases brought by Chinese forced laborers, and Korean forced
laborers, citing the April 2007 precedent. See, e.g., Toyama Chih6 Saibansho [Toyama Dist. Ct.] Sept.
19, 2007, unpublished opinion, "(Park Yu-jeong v. Fujikoshi and Japan") (citing the April 2007 Supreme
Court decisions in dismissing case brought by Korean forced laborers), slip opinion available at
justice.skr.jp/judgements/7 5-1.pdf.
22
Japanese corporations can incur legal liability in various ways. Like any natural person, a
corporate legal person is liable whenever it infringes another's personal rights. Minp6 [Civil Code], art.
709. Corporations can also incur liability for the conduct of their workers under a theory similar to
respondat superior. Id. at art. 715. Corporate officers can also incur liability in shareholder derivative
actions. See Bruce Aronson, Reconsidering the Importance ofLaw in Japanese Corporate Governance:
Evidence from the Daiwa Bank Shareholder Derivative Case, 36 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 11, 47--48
(2003)(describing changes to Japan's Commercial Code to limit director liability)
23
Recent scholarly treatments examine both the law and sociology of Asia's war reparations
movement. Legal analysis appears in Timothy Webster, Price of Settlement, supra note 5; Timothy
Webster, Discursive Justice: Interpreting World War II Litigation in Japan, 58 VA. J. INT'L L. 303 (2018)
(arguing that war reparations litigation seeks factual, legal and compensatory determinations) (hereinafter
"Discursive Justice"). Social science treatments appear in Celeste Arrington, The Mechanisms behind
Litigation's "Radiating Effects: " Historical Grievances against Japan, 53 LA w & Soc. REV. 6, 10-11
(2019) (finding Korean courts more amenable than Japanese courts to wartime compensation claims);
Yukiko Koga, Between the Law: The Unmaking ofEmpire and Law's Imperial Amnesia, 41 LAW & Soc.
INQUIRY 402 (2016). Prior legal treatments include William Gao, Note, Overdue Redress: Surveying
and Explaining the Shifting Japanese Jurisprudence on Victims' Compensation Claims, 45 CO LUM. J.
TRANSNAT' LL. 529 (2007); Timothy Webster, Note, Sisyphus in a Coalmine: Responses to Slave Labor
in Japan and the United States, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 733 (2006); Barry A. Fisher, Japan's Postwar
Compensation Litigation, 22 WHITTIER LAW REV. 35 (2000).

Disaggregating Corporate Liability

2020

181

they have generated heated debates in Japan, China, and to a lesser extent, Korea.
This Article not only fully accounts for Japan's forced labor litigation, it provides
theoretical frames to inform the discussion of corporate legal liability.
Second, it situates theories of corporate legal liability within Japanese law
and comparative law. As elsewhere in war reparations litigation, indirect theories of
liability appeal to Japanese judges. 24 This may reflect a cultural preference for
indirection or mediated solutions to politically sensitive problems. But it also
responds to prescription periods (statutes of limitation) under Japanese civil
procedure. Nevertheless legal theories, such as the duty of care, were well received
by Japanese judges, 25 and may provide a theory of corporate liability in other
jurisdictions. Forced labor and human trafficking are widespread at the present
moment. 26 Even if the ATS fades into obscurity, Japanese case law provides a
consistent theory of corporate liability for forced labor. 27
Third, this Article provides a revealing counterpoint to transatlantic
solutions that the United States negotiated with its European allies. 28 The 1990s
witnessed a resurgence of World War II-related litigation in the West. 29 On their
own, those lawsuits did not solve the underlying problems of forced labor, spoliated
bank accounts, and looted art. Instead, executive branch actors from the United
States and various European governments stepped in to broker bilateral agreements.
One can question the extent to which any of these mechanisms achieved its reparative
goals. 30 But one cannot deny the fact that the United States deployed far greater

See Webster, Discursive Justice, supra note 23, at 310.
See infra, Part III.
26
The ILO estimates that twenty-five million people engaged in forced labor worldwide in 2016
equivalent to the population of Australia. See Forced labour, modem slavery and human trafficking,
INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION https://www.ilo.org/global/topics/for ced-labour/lang
en/index.htm (last visited May 21, 2020).
27
As a jus cogens norm, forced labor has provided the jurisdictional nexus in several A TS
lawsuits. See, e.g., Doe v. Unocal, 395 F.3d 932, 946 (9th Cir. 2002) ("[F]orced labor is so widely
condemned that it has achieved the status of ajus cogens violation"); In re World War II Era Japanese
Forced Labor, 164 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1179 (N.D. Cal. 2001) ("[I]t seems beyond doubt that the forced
labor practices of defendants during the Second World War violated traditional international law");
Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424, 440 (D.N.J. 1999) ("The use of unpaid, forced labor
during World War II violated clearly established norms of customary international law.").
28
See, e.g., Leona Bilsky & Talia Fisher, Rethinking Settlement, 15 THEORETICAL lNQ. L. 77
(2015). The authors provide a balanced account of the Holocaust litigation movement. They
acknowledge that the corporate defendants did not assume "any legal responsibility" for their use of
forced labor during World War II, yet the movement ultimately provided monetary compensation,
prompted public deliberation, and clarified accountability norms. Id. at 80. See also ELAZAR BARKAN,
THE GUILT OF NATIONS: RESTITUTION AND NEGOTIATING HISTORICAL INJUSTICE 143-144 (2000)
(describing the contribution of Jewish NGOs, governments and lawyers to the restitution movement).
29 See MICHAEL J. BAZYLER, HOLOCAUST JUSTICE: THE BATTLE FOR RESTITUTION IN
AMERICA'S COURTS IO (2003) (describing accomplishments of Holocaust litigation movement)
(hereinafter, "HOLOCAUST JUSTICE"); Michael Bazyler & Roger P. Alford, Introduction, in HOLOCAUST
RESTITUTION: PERSPECTIVES ON THE LITIGATION AND ITS LEGACY I, 2-4 (Michael J. Bazyler & Roger
P. Alford eds. 2005) (briefly summarizing major events of the Holocaust litigation movement)
(hereinafter, "HOLOCAUST RESTITUTION").
3
Compare Si Frumkin, Why Won't Those SOBs Give Me My Money?, in HOLOCAUST
RESTITUTION, supra 29, at 91, with Roman Kent, It's Not about the Money: A Survivor's Perspective on
the German Foundation Initiative, in HOLOCAUST RESTITUTION, 205. Frumkin, one of the plaintiffs in
the U.S. slave labor litigation against Philipp Holzmann, A.G., wrote of his experience in the following
way: "I am bothered. I never authorized any Jewish organization to negotiate for my father or me. There
are, of course, some ex-slaves who gladly accepted the agreement-and they have the right to do so.
There are others, like myself, who object. We want direct confrontation and compensation to be decided
24

25

°
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resources to resolve lingering World War II issues in Europe than it has to similar
At a time when Japan and South Korea-America's two most
issues in Asia. 31
important Asian allies-are fighting a diplomatic battle over World War II
reparations, a more assertive American approach may be warranted.
Part I provides historical background on Japanese forced labor during World
War II, as well as contemporary efforts to remedy forced labor. Part II analyzes the
issue of corporate civil liability as discussed in a series of lawsuits, brought by
Chinese and Korean forced laborers, against Japanese corporations that used forced
labor during World War IL It provides a framework to understand the various
motivations behind these lawsuits, as well as a typology of legal liability that
Japanese courts have assigned. Part III distills lessons from Japan, with the
expectation that such lessons may apply, or at least inform, practice elsewhere,
including the United States. A conclusion crystalizes the prospects for corporate
civil liability for grave human rights abuses.
I. FORCED LABOR IN WORLD WAR II: CHINA, JAPAN, KOREA

Japan looked different a hundred years ago, when it was in the middle of an
imperial project comparable to that of several Western states. 32 In 1895, the Meiji
Emperor took Taiwan as a war prize from China after the first Sino-Japanese War
(1894-95). Ten years later, pursuant to the Treaty of Portsmouth, Japan came to
possess the southern half of Sakhalin Island, a concession from Czar Nicholas II after
the Russo-Japanese War (1905). By 1910, Japan completed its "annexation" of
Korea, its first colony on the Asian continent. In 1931, Japan invaded China again,
and began colonizing Manchuria shortly thereafter. Japan launched a full-scale war
against China in 1937, heralded by the Rape ofNanking (itself the subject ofa 12
year lawsuit from 1995 to 2007). 33 Japan invaded Southeast Asia in 1940, and
attacked Pearl Harbor, Hawaii in 1941.
The acceleration of Japanese militarism in the late 1930s and early 1940s
heightened demand for soldiers, guns, airplanes, munitions, and natural resources.
in court, on our behalf, by a jury of peers. This opportunity now appears to have been eliminated by my
government's decision and by that of the self-appointed Jewish makhers ("big shots")." Id. at 95. Kent
was likewise not completely satisfied with his experience with the German Remembrance Fund, noting
"What brought me some solace ... was knowing that tens of thousands of survivors received a small
form ofjustice, imperfect as it was, toward the end of their lives." Id. at 214.
31
See Barry Fisher, Notes.from the World War II Redress Trenches: The Disparate Treatment of
Victims East and West, 32 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 95, 105 (2010). America's disparate
treatment of Europeans vis-a-vis Asians has deep roots. The United States interned Japanese-American
citizens, but not German-Americans. The United States dropped a nuclear bomb on Japan, but not
Germany or Italy. After the war, the United States spent nearly $100 billion, in 2014 dollars, to resurrect
Western Europe under the Marshall Plan, but devised no such recovery for East Asia. See SEYMOUR
MORRIS, JR., SUPREME COMMANDER: MACARTHUR'S TRIUMPH IN JAPAN 236 (2014) (describing
President Truman's rejection of a Marshall Plan for Asia).
32
According to the eminent historian Peter Duus, Japanese imperialism was intimately linked to
its decision, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, to modernize. Unlike in prior eras, the
imperialism of that time was driven by nation-states, not by private industries or trading companies. See
generally PETER Duus, THE ABACUS AND THE SWORD: THE JAPANESE PENETRATION OF KOREA 2--4
(1995).
33
Tokyo Chih6 Saibansho [Tokyo Dist. Ct.] Sept. 22, 1997, 1028 HANREI TAIMUZU [HANTA] 92
("Li Xiuying v. Japan") (dismissing claims against the Japanese government for various crimes against
humanity as time-barred), aff"ed, Tokyo Koto Saibansho [Tokyo H. Ct.] Apr. 19, 2005, unpublished
opinion, ajf'ed SAIKO SAIBANSHO (Sup. Ct.] May 9, 2007.
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To address wartime labor shortages, Japan enacted the National Mobilization Law in
1938. 34 For the next seven years, Japan enacted measures to conscript ethnic Koreans
(colonial subjects of the Japanese Empire), and Chinese citizens (including both
prisoners of war and civilians). The following section roughly sketches Japan's
forced labor apparatuses in Korea and China. The historical context helps fill in the
legal record, and delineates the boundary between state and corporate
collaboration-a line still being drawn today.
A. Forced Labor in Korea

Since Korea was a formal colony of Japan, the forced labor apparatus was
instituted by force of Japanese domestic law. In 1938, in response to labor shortages,
Japan passed the National Mobilization Law, initially applying it only within Japan
proper (naichi, inner lands). 35 But by 1939, Japan began conscripting laborers from
36
Korea (then considered part of gaichi, or foreign lands).
Japan's forced labor program unfolded over three phases. In the first phase
(1939-1942), corporations had to obtain permission from the colonial Japanese
government in Korea ("Governor-General") in order to conscript directly from
specially designated regions. The corporations prepared lists of necessary personnel,
and submitted them to colonial authorities. In many instances, the corporations
conducted physical examinations of the Korean forced laborers, verified their
identities, and transported them to Japan. 37
In the second phase (1942-1944), the Governor-General took control of the
process, transmitting requests from Japanese corporations to Korean provincial
officers. In this new phase, ethnic Koreans rounded up laborers based upon a quota
for each town and village. In retreating from the conscription process, the Japanese
government attempted to "Koreanize" it. 38 According to Professor Bruce Cumings
of the University of Chicago, the selection process was "harsh," "divisive," and
"haphazard."39 Over time, the Korean officials tasked with recruiting their
40
countrymen for forced labor became "the most hated men in their communities."

Kokka S6d6in H6 [National Mobilization Law], Law no. 55of1938.
Kokumin Ch6y6 Rei [National Service Order], Order no. 451 of 1939. The order took effect on
the Korea peninsula through order 600of1939. Nagasaki Chiho Saibansho [Nagasaki Dist. Ct.] Dec. 2,
1997), 1641 HANREI JIHO 124 ("Kim Sun-gil v. Mitsubishi Heavy Industry"), slip opinion available at
justice.skr.jp/judgments/19-1.pdf. See id. at 6.
36
Korean scholars divide Japanese mobilization into three types: labor, military and sexual. Chung
Hye-Kyung, The Forcible Drafting of Koreans during the Final Phase of Colonial Rule and the
Formation ofthe Korean Community in Japan, 44 KOREAN J. 30, 33 (2004). Labor mobilization included
the various mobilizations discussed here, as well as the Patriotic Laborers Corps (1938-1945) Patriotic
Student Corps (1938-1945), and Women's Volunteer Corps (1944-1945). Military mobilization
included civilian employees (1939-1945), army (1938-1945), navy (1943-1945), and student soldiers
( 1943-1945). Sexual mobilization included "comfort women," the roughly I 00,000 Korean women who
served as sexual slaves to soldiers and others in the Imperial Japanese Army.
37
Id. at 37-38.
38
The United States performed a similar move in Vietnam, reducing U.S. troop involvement and
enlisting more South Vietnamese troops. President Nixon called this "Vietnamizing" the conflict. It is
also known as the Nixon Doctrine. See Jeffrey Kimball, The Nixon Doctrine: A Saga of
Misunderstanding, 36 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 59 (2006).
39
BRUCE CUMINGS, KOREA'S PLACE IN THE SUN: A MODERN HISTORY 178 (2d ed. 2005).
40
Id.
34

35
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As these lawsuits attest, Korean school teachers and administrators actively exhorted
their pupils to work in Japan. 41 Korean complicity in the forced labor program is
sometimes overlooked in the current debate about war responsibility. But ethnic
Koreans mobilized boys and girls, some as young as 10, to go work in Japan.
In the third phase (l 944-1945), the Governor-General tightened control of
the recruitment project. Forcible, indeed violent, conscription increased: people were
abducted off the streets, villages attacked in search of able-bodied workers. 42 The
Korean forced labor program used force in all three phases, but turned progressively
more coercive toward the later years ofthe War, reaching its apogee in the final year. 43
Japan mobilized Korean women and children through other programs. 44 For
instance, the Japanese Government issued an ordinance in August 1944 to mobilize
Korean women between the ages of 14 and 40. 45 Some women were sent to work as
forced laborers in Japanese factories, while others became "comfort women" for the
Japanese army in China, Southeast Asia and the South Pacific. 46 By the end of the
war, an estimated 2.1 million Korean men and women lived in Japan, most of them
working as forced laborers. 47

B. Forced Labor in China
Even with millions of Korean laborers, Japanese industry found itself
shorthanded. Japanese trade groups, especially in mining and construction, requested
additional assistance from the Japanese government to secure labor-including a
special plea for Chinese workers in 1939. 48 In July 1941, the Japanese government
responded by establishing a government agency-the North China Labor Association
(NCLA)-to coordinate labor recruitment in Mainland China. With the help of
government agencies and corporate councils, the NCLA established branch offices
throughout North China.
The establishment of the NCLA marked a decisive tum in Sino-Japanese
labor relations. From 1937 to 1941, Japan sporadically recruited Chinese laborers,
often deploying deception in the process. 49 But by 1941, Japan had conquered vast
swaths ofNortheast China, allowing the NCLA to forcibly conscript Chinese laborers

41

Toyama ChihO Saibansho [Toyama Dist. Ct.] July 24, 1997, 941 HANREI TAIMUZU
[HANTA] 183, 187 ("Yi Jong-suk v. Fujikoshi"), slip opinion available at justice.skr.jp/judgements/23
1.pdf.
42
Chung, supra note 36, at 40.
43
See id. at 37; Chang Seok Heung, Overseas Migration of Koreans in the Colonial Period and the
Historicity of Repatriation, 44 KOREAN J. 5, 9 (2004).
44
Chung, supra note 36, at 40-41.
45
Chang, supra note 43, at 10.
46
See id. at 9.
47
See id. at 10; Cumings, supra note 39, at 177-178.
48
William Underwood, NHK's Finest Hour: Japan's Official Record of Forced Labor, DOAM,
http://www.doam.org/index.php/projekte/raeume-der-erinnenmg/zwangsarbeiter9 start=7 (last visited
May 21, 2020). The "internal transfer"(~~ suggests that Japan concentrated its recruitment efforts
in Chinese territory the Japanese Army had just conquered.
49
Ju Zhifen, Northern Chinese Laborers & Manchukuo, in ASIAN LABOR IN THE WARTIME
JAPANESE EMPIRE 61, 61 (Paul H. Kratoska ed., 2005).
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by the millions. Japan sent Chinese forced laborers all over Asia; about 40,000 ended
up at 135 worksites across the Japanese archipelago. 50
Japanese corporations were involved in the process. In some cases, Japanese
corporations submitted "numerical requests for Chinese manpower" to the
government. " 51 The NCLA would then procure the laborers, transport them to
Chinese ports, and then traffic them to Japan. Some companies actually sent staff to
China, where the picked up forced laborers in Qingdao and Tanggu (now part of
Tianjin), and brought them to Japan. This amounts to direct participation in human
trafficking, or what the Japanese call "forced mobilization" or "forcible
transportation." 52
In October, 1942, Japanese trade groups formalized their demand in a
53
document entitled "Matter Relating to the Service of Northern Chinese Laborers."
The Japanese Cabinet responded one month later, with "Matter Relating to the
Promotion of Internal Importation of Chinese Laborers." 54 This Cabinet Decision
55
listed the desired qualifications of forced laborers and future measures to adopt.
Japan then enacted the first or "experimental" phase of its forced labor program,
abducting 1,411 Chinese men to Japan. 56 In March, 1944, with the experiement
receiving a satisfied reception, the policy entered its second or "earnest" phase,
procuring another 37,524 men and boys. 57
As detailed in numerous judicial opinions, Japanese corporations treated
58
Chinese forced laborers with callous disregard, literally working them to death. One
60
in six Chinese laborers died in Japan. 59 At some sites, that number reached one-half.
Such conditions reflect a basic abrogation of the most basic human right: the right to
live. These opinions help clarify the historical record, and convey obscure chapters
of wartime history to contemporary audiences.
Shortly after the War, Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent investigators
to each of the 135 worksites that used Chinese forced labor. The Ministry requested
information directly from the thirty-five corporations that used forced labor. Based
on this information, it complied a 646-page report, to be used in the event that the

so Ju Zhifen, Labor Conscription in North China: 1941-1945, in CHINA AT WAR: REGIONS OF
CHINA 1937-1945, 207, 213 (Stephen R. MacKinnon, Diana Lary & Ezra F. Vogel eds., 2007).
51
Underwood, supra note 48.
52
Japanese courts differentiate forced mobilization (kyosei renk6 ~~ and forced labor
(kyosei r6d6 ~YJ).
53
The historical circumstances surrounding the creation and implementation of the Chinese forced
labor policy are detailed in numerous trial court decisions. See, e.g., Nagano Chih6 Saibansho [Nagano
Dist. Ct.] Mar. 10, 2006, 1931 HANREI JIH6 109 ("Zhang v. Kajima Construction"), (available at
http://justice.skr.jp/souran/souran-jp-web.htm.
id.
54
55
The policy listed an upper age limit of"approximately forty," with "priority given to single men
under thirty years of good quality and sound body." Id. at 9.
Id.
56

See id. (honkaku i'nyfi~~See, e.g., Tokyo Koto Saibansho [Tokyo H. Ct.] Apr. 19, 2005, unpublished opinion ("Li
Xiuying v. Japan") O (detailing Japanese war crimes, including the use of chemical weapons, the Rape
of Nanjing, and indiscriminate bombing of civilians), (opinion on file with the Stanford Journal of
International Law).
59
William Underwood, Chinese Forced Labor, the Japanese Government, and the Prospects for
Redress, ASIA- PACIFIC J. (July 6, 2005), https://apjjf.org/-William-Underwood/1693/article.html.
60 Id.
57

58

186

STANFORD JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

56:2

Allied powers (including war-tom China) prosecuted Japanese war criminals. 61
Later, the Ministry publicly claimed to have burned all documents related to the
forced labor program, a falsehood it maintained until 1993, when Japan's national
broadcaster (NHK) unearthed a copy. 62 But let us first review the immediate
aftermath of the War before turning to the present reevaluation of it.
C. After World War JI

After World War II, the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals weighed the
possibility of criminal liability for German and Japanese enterprises. But they neither
indicted any corporations, nor devoted significant attention to the roles that
corporations played in the War. Instead, "national" military tribunals indicted high
level officers from corporations involved in the war industry. In Europe, the United
States tried employees of three German corporations-Krupp, LG. Farben, and
Flick-for various crimes, including forced labor. 63 Many individual officers were
pronounced guilty, either as "principals and accessories" in a criminal conspiracy
(Flick), or as "the instrumentality" through which the corporation committed crimes
(Farben). 64
In Asia, the United Kingdom tried nine corporate officers of one Japanese
corporation-Nippon Mining Company-for abusing forced laborers (including
POWs) at a mine in Taiwan. 65 Five Japanese men were ultimately convicted. 66 In
both the German and Japanese cases, defendants were natural persons tried in their
capacities as corporate officers; the corporation itself was not a defendant. Moreover,
the postwar tribunals were criminal in nature; they did not address the issue of civil
liability. Nor did they touch on the related topic of compensation.
The Tokyo Tribunal, of more direct relevance to this Article, did not
investigate the issue ofcorporate responsibility in World War II. The Russians hoped
to indict Japanese conglomerates (zaibatsu), particularly those most directly involved
in the war efforts. 67 But American officials resisted this suggestion, believing that
the corporations did not set policy, but merely followed it. 68 Nor were the Americans

61

62

Id.
Id.

63
See Jackson Maogoto, The Work ofNational Military Tribunals under Control Council Law 10,
in THE LEGAL REGIME OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 51, 53-55 (Jose Doria, Hans-Peter

Gasser & M. CherifBassiouni eds., 2009).
64
Id. at 55.
65
Anita Ramasastry, Corporate Complicity: From Nuremberg to Rangoon, An Examination of
Forced Labor Cases and Their Impact on the Liability ofMultinational Corporations, 20 BERKELEY J.
lNT'LL.91, 113-15(2002).
66
Id. at 114.
67
See LINDA GOETZ HOLMES, UNJUST ENRICHMENT: How JAPAN'S COMPANIES BUILT
POSTWAR FORTUNES USING AMERICAN POWS 130 (2000).
68
Id. at 129. Holmes is unsparing in her criticism of American ignorance. As she writes, "Like
nearly all the aides and advisers who were assigned to Japan during the 1945 to 1952 occupation, [General
MacArthur's main political advisor William] Sebald had no expertise in the Japanese language, history
or culture." Id. at 128. Likewise, the American prosecutor at Tokyo, Joseph Keenan, had little experience
with Japan, or even outside the United States. An American journalist covering the Tokyo Tribunal
asserted that Keenan's "knowledge of Asian affairs ... did not extend beyond chow mein." See ARNOLD
C. BRACKMAN, THE OTHER NUREMBERG: THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE TOKYO WAR CRIMES TRIALS 55
(1989).
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persuaded by the idea of Japanese reparations, especially to China. 69 As a result,
much of the suffering experienced by Asians-Chinese and Koreans chief among
them-went ignored. 70
During the American occupation of Japan (1945-1952), the Supreme
Commander of the Allied Powers, General Douglas MacArthur, ordered the
dissolution and reorganization of many zaibatsu. While hundreds ofcompanies were
initially slated for restructuring, in the end only a few were dissolved and
resurrected. 71 Among the reconstituted entities were Mitsui, Mitsubishi, and Nippon
Steel, 72 all of which have defended forced labor lawsuits. The postwar dissolution
program has reemerged in the war compensation lawsuits in the form of an
affirmative defense: Mitsubishi, Mitsui and others insist that they are, at present,
legally distinct from the entities that used force labor during World War II. This
defense has succeeded in some suits, 73 but not all. 74
D. After the Cold War: An Overview of Transnational War Reparations
Litigation

As in the West, East Asia did not dwell on war liability issues in the decades
following World War II. The emergence of the Cold War froze discussions of

69
See MORRIS, supra note 31, at 232-33. General MacArthur rejected the idea of Japanese war
reparations as a "camouflage method of subsidizing other nations from the U.S." In essence, MacArthur
viewed Japanese reparations to China as a loss for the United States. Given the damage that Japan
inflicted upon China during the war-14 million dead, 80 million displaced, the destruction of most
Chinese infrastructure-MacArthur's parsimony seems misplaced. See RANA MlTTER, FORGOTTEN
ALLY: CHINA'S WORLD WAR II, 1937-1945, 5-6 (2013).
70
This is a relatively common critique of the Tokyo Tribunal, particularly among Asian scholars.
See, e.g., Narrelle Morris, Justice for 'Asian' Victims: The Australian War Crimes Trials ofthe Japanese,
1945-1951, in THE HIDDEN HISTORIES OF WAR CRIMES TRIALS 358, 359 (Kevin Heller & Gerry
Simpson eds. 2013); YUMA TOTAN I, THE TOKYO WAR CRIMES TRIAL: THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE IN THE
WAKE OF WORLD WAR II 162-63, 255-56 (2008).
71
MIKJSO HANE, EASTERN PHOENIX: JAPAN SINCE 1945, 26 (1997).
72 Id.
73
Nippon Steel successfully argued it was distinct from the wartime entity in Shin Ch 'eon-Su v.
Nippon Steel, supra note 18. When the same plaintiffs brought the case in South Korea, the South Korean
Supreme Court ultimately found in their favor, and determine that defendant Nippon Steel was the same
entity that used forced labor during the war. See Yeo v. Nippon Steel, 2009 Da 68620 (Sup. Ct. Korea,
May 24, 2012), translated in Seokwoo Lee, Supreme Court ofKorea: 1st Division, 2 KOREAN J. INT'L
& COMP. L. 93 (2018). Professors Miwa and Ramseyer write that, though the reorganization purged
some senior executives, the "internal affairs of the corporations [remained] largely intact." Yoshiro Miwa
& J. Mark Ramseyer, Does Ownership Matter? Evidence from the Zaibatsu Dissolution Program, 12 J.
ECON. & MAN. STRATEGY 67, 73 (2003).
74
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries also claimed to be legally distinct from the wartime entity of the
same name. This argument succeeded at trial, but was overturned on appeal. See Park Hae-ok v.
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries & Japan, supra note 19, (dismissing claims based on Article 2(1) of the
Japan-Korea Claims Agreement). On appeal, the court ultimately ruled in favor of Mitsubishi, but made
several factual and legal findings against the corporation. See Nagoya K5t5 Saibansho (Nagoya H. Ct.]
May 31, 2007, 1894 HANREI JJH6 44 ("Park v. Mitsubishi Heavy Industries & Japan"), slip opinion
available at justice.skr.jp/judgements/59-2.pdf. The appellate court was, in essence, bound by the April
2007 decision from the Supreme Court decision that wartime claims were disposed by postwar treaties.
Yet, the court of appeals held that "the respondent corporation's claim-that it bore no responsibility for
participating in any of the illegal acts by the old company---cannot be accepted under the principles of
good faith." Id., slip opinion at 20. The court went on to state that Mitsubishi bore liability for damage
under Articles 709, 715 and 719 of Japan's Civil Code. Id. However, because of the Supreme Court's
decision, the court exculpated Mitsubishi under the theory of postwar waiver. Id. at 64-65.
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wartime liability, as the geopolitical map morphed; America's enemies became its
allies, and its allies its enemies. 75 The United States would rebuild Germany and
Japan as bulwarks against the spread of communism.
Decades later, with the end of the Cold War, renewed attention fell on the
historical and legal antecedents of the early twentieth century. 76 Chinese activists,
operating in a tightly constrained political environment, publicly questioned the
adequacy of Japan's war reparations. 77 The most well-known activist in this regard,
Tong Zeng, spearheaded a war reparations movement in China that remains active
even now, three decades after he took up the cause. 78 In response to the activism of
Tong and others, the PRC government has voiced equivocal support for war
reparations on a few occasions. 79 It begrudgingly allowed Chinese citizens to sue in
Japan, 80 but has otherwise done little to support the cause. 81 Instead, Chinese
survivors have relied on Japanese human rights lawyers, Japanese civil society
organizations, and a handful of Chinese activists and lawyers to spearhead the
reparations campaign.
South Korea's war reparations movement also gained momentum in the
early 1990s. Availing themselves of new freedoms after four decades of dictatorship,
Korean citizens and civil society organizations challenged verities inherited from

75
See MITTER, supra note 69, at I 0. Professor Mitter describes how the United States "traded" its
wartime ally (China) for the enemy (Japan) after the War. It made a similar trade in Europe, exchanging
its wartime enemy (Germany) for wartime ally (Soviet Union).
76
Sheila Miyoshi Jager and Rana Mitter describe how the dissolution of the basic Cold War
antinomy produced new interpretations of World War II among China, Japan and Korea. They attribute
the democratization of Korea and rise of China as contributing factors to the reinterpretation of war
accountability. See Sheila Miyoshi Jager and Rana Mitter, Introduction: Re-envisioning Asia, Past and
Present, in RUPTURED HISTORIES: WAR, MEMORY AND THE POST-COLD WAR IN ASIA I, 3-5 (Sheila
Miyoshi Jager and Rana Mitter eds. 2007).
77
While earning his master's degree in law from Peking University, Tong Zeng published a short
essay arguing that individual Chinese citizens retained the right to seek compensation from Japan, even
though the Chinese government had given up its right to seek compensation under international law. See
CAROLINE ROSE, SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS: FACING THE PAST, LOOKING TO THE FUTURE? 74-75
(2005).
78
See Lucy Homby, Family squabbles rock boat in landmark China reparations case, FIN. TIMES,
Apr. 25, 2016 (calling Tong a "rights activist who electrified China when he first proposed individual
reparations in the early 1990s").
79
Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen responded to a journalist's question about reparations in
the following way: "The Chinese government stated in the Sino-Japanese Joint Communique that the
compensation issue has been resolved. But we will not interfere if some Chinese victims want to contact
Japanese parties." JAPAN ECONOMIC NEWSWIRE, Qian Qichen Backs Demand for Japanese War
Reparations, Mar. 23, 1992. He repeated the claim in 1995.
80
In 1995, the first group of Chinese victims were set to go to Tokyo and file their lawsuit.
According to various media reports, the Chinese government requested that the Japanese embassy in
Beijing not issue travel visas to PRC citizens who intended to travel to push for reparations. Chinese
authorities also confiscated Tong Zeng's passport, preventing him from leading the delegation to Japan.
See, e.g., SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, War reparations activists say fight goes on despite ban an
attending commemorations, Aug. 6, 1995; REUTERS, Chinese war victims cancel Japan trip, Aug. 3,
1995.
81
For over a decade, Chinese courts refused to accept cases brought by war victims. Koga, supra
note 23, at 430. In 2014, a Beijing court finally accepted a case, which settled two years later. Since
Chinese courts often do not explain why they rejected a specific case, we are left to speculate. Possible
explanations would include (a) the importance of maintaining Sino-Japanese relations, particularly during
periods of international isolation for China (e.g. 1989-1990); (b) the priority of attracting Japanese
investment in China; and (c) the political sensitivity of foreign policy in China.
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four decades of dictatorship. 82 Their activism focused on several historical eras, most
83
prominently the colonial period, and the War in particular. Two prominent groups
active in war reparations also emerged in the early years of Korean democracy: the
85
Korean Council84 and the Association of Bereaved Families.
In August, 1991, the Korean Council received a phone call from a woman,
Kim Hak-Sun, who acknowledged that she had been a "comfort woman" during
World War II, breaking nearly a half-century of silence. Kim chronicled her
abduction by the Japanese military in 1941, and months of imprisonment and forced
sex with Japanese soldiers. 86 Kim made history again by suing the Japanese
government for an apology and monetary compensation in December 1991. Her case
set in motion a war reparations movement that has spread across the Asia-Pacific.
Hundreds of World War II victims have stepped forward to file lawsuits in China,
87
Plaintiffs include
Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and the United States.
comfort women, forced laborers, subjects of medical experimentation, hibakusha
(persons irradiated by the American bombing of Nagasaki and Hiroshima), prisoners
of war, and others hurt during the war.
Japanese courts have presided over the largest number ofdisputes, producing
over one hundred judgments at trial, appellate, and Supreme Court levels. These
judgments do not, by and large, favor the plaintiffs. But a pair of 2018 decisions by
the South Korean Supreme Court-Japanese corporations to pay Korean forced
laborers-has opened a new front in the battle for reparations. At present, at least a
dozen lawsuits against Japanese corporations are currently pending in the South
Korean judiciary. 88

South Korea's embrace of democracy, after four decades of authoritarian rule, meant
reexamining a host of historical issues, including the colonial period (1910-1945), and the Pacific War
(1937-1945) in particular.
83
Immediately after democratization, South Korea's National Assembly (Congress) began to
investigate the 1980 Gwangju Uprising. Over the 1990s and 2000s, South Korea would establish over a
dozen Truth and Reconciliation Committees to examine various chapters ofKorean history. See generally
Ethan Hee-seok Shin, The "Comfort Women" Reparation Moveent: Between Universal Women's Human
Rights and Particular Anti-Colonial Nationalism, 28 FLA. J. INT'L L. 87, 127-178 (2016) (noting the
Korean government's various efforts to reconcile its colonial and dictatorial past); Andrew Wolman,
Looking Back While Moving Forward: The Evolution of Truth Commissions in Korea, 14 ASIAN-PAC.
L. & POL'Y J. 27, 35-36 (2013) (describing the truth commissions established after Korea's transition to
democracy).
84
The Korean Council for Women Drafted for Military Sexual Slavery by Japan (Hanguk
Jeongshindae Munje Taech'aek Hyeop-eui-hoe] was founded in 1990 by Yun Chung-Ok, a Professor of
English at the prestigious Ewha Women's University. The Council has focused on mobilizing public
opinion about "comfort women" since its inception; it has organized over 1,000 weekly demonstrations
outside of Japan's embassy in Seoul to raise awareness about the "comfort women." See C. SARAH SOH,
THE COMFORT WOMEN: SEXUAL VIOLENCE AND POSTCOLONIAL MEMORY IN KOREA AND JAPAN 57
(2008).
85
The Korean Association of Pacific War Victims and Bereaved Families (T'aepyeongyang
Jeonjaeng Hisaengja Yujok-hoe) was re-formed after the end of authoritarian rule in the 1989. Id. at 96
97. While both groups aim to secure reparations for war victims, their tactics have been different, and
substantial tensions have flared up between the Council and the Association at various points over the
years. Id. at 97.
86
Rebecca Tan, Despite protests from Japan, South Korea holds first memorial day for 'comfort
women' enslaved in World War II Brothels, WASH. POST, Aug. 14, 2018.
87
Webster, Discursive Justice, supra note 23, at 163.
88
A complete list of cases filed in South Korea can be found online. See Hanguk Jeonhu Posang
Jaep'an Illam [Overview of Postwar Compensation Litigation in Korea], available at
justice.skr.jp/souran/souran-kr-web.htrn
82
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Lawsuits against corporations form an integral piece of the war reparations
movement. Even before Ms. Kim Hak-Sun filed her epochal lawsuit against Japan,
one of her compatriots had sued a Japanese steel manufacturer. 89 Mr. Kim Kyeong
seok (no relation to Ms. Kim) submitted a handwritten complaint against Japan Steel
for forcible conscription and forced labor. 90 Thereafter, hundreds of Chinese and
Korean forced laborers would file dozens oflawsuits against Japan's most powerful
multinational enterprises in Japan, Korea, China and the United States.
In the main, Japanese judges dismiss war reparations cases-against the
government or corporate sector-as either time-barred or waived by relevant treaties.
The handful of court-ordered damage awards date from the early 2000s. In 2007, the
Supreme Court of Japan determined that postwar treaties between waived all
individual claims for war reparations, obviating a judicially-ordered damages
award. 91 This decision did not, however, forestall litigation in the region. First,
plaintiffs continued to appeal unfavorable Japanese rulings even after 2007,
suggesting the goal of litigation was as much about activism as it was seeking a court
ordered remedy. Second, Chinese and Korean plaintiffs turned to their home
courts-in Beijing, Shijiazhuang, Seoul, Busan, and so on-to seek redress.
II. CORPORATE CIVIL LIABILITY FOR WORLD WAR II HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES
Tort is the eye through which the thin thread of corporate liability must pass.
This may seem an uncomfortable fit-using civil law to adjudicate criminal activity
or international human rights abuses. Indeed, criminal trials appear more suited to
such conduct, as evident in the "justice cascades" that have flowed over various Latin
American states in the 1980s and 1990s. 92 But criminal trials require the
coordination-and the blessing-of the executive branch. They also tend to focus
on natural persons, state officials and the like, as opposed to legal entities like
corporations. For any number of reasons, the current Japanese government is
unlikely to review either its own potential criminality, or that of Japanese
corporations, for World War II-era activity. 93 Instead, civil litigation may be the only
89
Kim Hak-Sun v. Japan, unpublished opinion (Tokyo D. Ct., Mar. 26, 200I), slip opinion
available at justice.skr.jp/judgements/J 7-1.pdf.
90
See Tokyo Chiho Saibansho [Tokyo Dist. Ct.] May 26, 1997, 1614 HANREI JIHO 41 ("Kim
Kyeong-Seok v. NKK [Nippon K6kan Kabushiki Kaisha]"), slip opinion available at
justice.skr.jp/judgements/15-1.pdf. The trial court found that Kim had not been forcibly mobilized, but
went to Japan of his own accord. The court also found that the conditions at the steel foundry-while
poor-<lid not amount to forced labor. Finally, the court determined that security agents at the foundry
beat Kim, irreparably injuring his right shoulder. This beating amounted to a tort, even if the twenty
year statute of limitations to bring a tort lawsuit had elapsed. Id. at 50
91
See Song Jixiao v. Nishimatsu Constrnction Co., supra note 20 (holding individual claims for
war reparations were waived by postwar treaties). See also Mark A. Levin, International Decision:
Nishimatsu Construction Co. v. Song Jixiao, 102 AM. J. INT'L L. 148 (2008).
92
KATHRYN SIKKINK, THE JUSTICE CASCADE: How HUMAN RIGHTS PROSECUTIONS ARE
CHANGING WORLD POLITICS 5 (2010) (defining justice cascade as a "dramatic new trend in world
politics toward holding individual state officials, including heads of states, criminally accountable for
human rights violations ... [which] started as a small stream, but later caught on suddenly, sweeping
along many actors in its wake.").
93
The current Japanese Prime Minister, Abe Shinzo, has made several remarks to deny or
downplay Japan's role in wartime atrocities. In 2007, for instance, Prime Minister Abe stated "There
was no evidence to prove there was coercion as initially suggested." Colin Joyce, Japanese PM denies
wartime
comfort
women
were
forced,
TELEGRAPH
(Mar.
3,
2007),
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judicial intervention possible, attested by dozens of lawsuits across the world. Tort
law has, in many contexts, proven sufficiently malleable to expose, sanction, and
occasionally remediate corporate misconduct, wherever and whenever it has
occurred. 94 Before turning to how courts fashion tort law to address human rights
abuses, a few words about the general subject in Japan are in order.
Like most civil codes, Japan's is written in plain, expansive language,
adaptable to a wide variety of contexts. Japan's primary tort provision-article 709
of the Civil Code-states that "[a] person who has intentionally or negligently
infringed any right of others ... shall be liable to compensate any damages resulting
in consequence."95 Based on this provision, most scholars argue that the underlying
96
aim of Japanese tort law is compensatory: to restore the victim to her ex ante status.
Indeed, the Supreme Court of Japan has explicitly endorsed compensation as the sole
purpose of tort law, specifically excluding deterrence and punishment from the ambit
of private law. 97
But tort law serves public purposes in Japan, just as it does in the United
States. From environmental pollution98 and women's employment, 99 to the treatment
of minorities 100 and regulation of hate speech, 101 Japanese tort law has enabled
countless victims of private wrongs to address matters of public significance. This
resembles the public law litigation hailed by the late Professor Abram Chayes as
102
"inevitable ifjustice is to be done in an increasingly regulated society."
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1544471 IJapanese-PM-denies-wartime-comfort-women
were-forced.html. Several months later, the U.S. House of Representatives responded with a non-binding
resolution, drafted by Congressman Mike Honda, calling on Japan to acknowledge, apologize, and accept
responsibility for enslaving hundreds of thousands of Asian women. See Mike Honda, Time for Abe to
apologize, properly, CNN (Apr. 29, 2015), https://www.cnn.com/2015/04/28/opinions/honda-abe
comfort-women-issue/index.html.
94
For developments in the United Kingdom, see SIMON BAUGHEN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND
CORPORATE WRONGS: CLOSING THE GOVERNANCE GAP 172-90 (2015). The Business and Human
Rights Resource Centre website lists many lawsuits challenging corporate involvement in human rights
abuses from around the world. See, e.g., Anvil Mining, supra note 14.
95
Minpo [Civil Code], art. 709.
96
See Eri Osaka, Reevaluating the Role ofthe Tort Liability System in Japan, 26 ARiz. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 393, 394 (2009).
97 See Saiko Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] July 11, 1997, 51MINSHO2573 ("Mansei Kogyo"). In this case,
an American plaintiff tried to enforce a California judgment for punitive damages in Japan. The Supreme
Court of Japan clarified that Japanese tort law aims to redress actual damage through monetary awards,
but does not permit punitive damages. The Court explicitly denied that the tort system should sanction
perpetrators or deter future conduct. Such functions are for the criminal or administrative system. Id. at
2575.
98
FRANK K. UPHAM, LAW & SOCIAL CHANGE IN JAPAN 58 (1987) (describing the role of courts
in remedying the "Big Four" environmental lawsuits of the 1960s and 1970s).
99
Frank K. Upham, Stealth Activism: Norm Formation by Japanese Courts, 88 WASH. U. L. REV.
1493, 1501 (2011) (describing the interaction between the Japanese judiciary and legislature in the
creation of the Equal Employment Opportunity Law).
100
Timothy Webster, Reconstituting Japanese Law: International Norms and Domestic Litigation,
30 MICH. J. lNT'L L. 211 213 (2008) (noting the results of racial discrimination lawsuits, and their
configuration as tort in Japanese law)
101
Ayako Hatano, The Internalization of International Human Rights Law: The Case of Hate
Speech in Japan, 50 N.Y.U. J. lNT'L L. & POL. 637, 642 (2018) (describing the construction of racial
discrimination as a tort in Japanese law).
102 Abram Chayes, The Role ofthe Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976).
Among many others, Professor Harold Koh has adapted Chayes' insights for transnational human rights
litigation. See Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100 YALE L.J. 234 7, 2367-68
( 1991) (describing the role of domestic courts in internalizing international human rights norms).
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Assigning tort liability for events that took place over seventy years ago may
well seem the apotheosis of academic abstraction. Yet as decades of litigation in
Europe, Asia and North America suggest, the issue of legal liability is fiercely
contested by survivors, corporations and governments alike. 103 The current plunge in
Japan-South Korea relations-reportedly the lowest point in bilateral relations in
decades-stems directly from the Supreme Court's decision to hold Mitsubishi and
Nippon Steel legally liable for their wartime use of forced labor. 104
Since Japan's forced labor program was implemented by legislation (in
Korea) and by a Cabinet decision (in China), many corporations argue that the forced
labor itself was legal. Corporations cannot incur legal liability for a legally
prescribed act. But Chinese and Korean forced laborers demand that Japanese courts
determine the legality of the specific corporation's treatment of them, irrespective of
the implementing law or regulation. The lawsuit draws attention to the individual
corporation's role in the forced labor program.
Japanese judges take seriously the proposition that they are judging:
delineating conduct in which the parties engaged, determining the legality of those
acts, deciding whether defenses apply, and attaching legal liability as appropriate. 105
They carefully lay out the conduct of all relevant parties: laborers, corporations,
government, military, recruitment agencies in Asia, as well as the interactions
between various actors (such as trade groups and the government). These judicial
interpretations help enshrine norms of corporate legal liability by depicting the
corporation's conduct, using tort law to weigh its legality, and then deciding whether
the conduct violated the law. 106 The repeated determination of illegal conduct, across
time and space, cements the notion that corporations incur legal liability when they

103
See Webster, Price ofSettlement, supra note 5. Even when companies settle, they insist that the
agreement explicitly absolve the company of any legal liability. See id. at 336 (reporting statement by
Nippon Steel spokesman that "we ... bear no legal liability for these acts"), and 340 (reporting statement
by NKK that the company bore no legal liability for the abduction, enslavement and torture of Korean
forced labor, Kim Kyeong-seok).
104
See Simon Denyer, Japan-South Korea ties 'worst in five decades' as US. leaves alliance
untended, WASH. POST (Feb. 9, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/japan
south-korea-ties-worst-in-five-decades-as-us- Ieaves-alliance-untended/20 19/02/08/fl 723 Obe-2ad8
1 l e9-906e-9d55b645 l eb4_story.html; Chemical Corrosion: Relations between Japan and South Korea
are
fraying
alarmingly,
ECONOMIST
(July
20,
2019),
https://www.economist.com/asia/2019/07/18/relations-between-japan-and-south-korea-are-fraying
alarmingl y (describing various retaliatory measures that both Japan and South Korea have taken in
response to the South Korean Supreme Court's 2018 verdicts).
105
This feature of the Japanese judiciary may result from the inquisitorial (civil law) background,
where judges ascertain the facts, apply the applicable law, guide courtroom debates and arrive at a legal
conclusion. The Japanese civil litigation system is perhaps best described as a hybrid of inquisitorial and
adversarial models. See Kohei Nakab6, Judicial Reform and the State ofJapan's Attorney System: A
Discussion ofAttorney Reform Issues and the Future of the Judiciary, IO PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 623,
634, 640 (2001).
106
See, e.g., Kim Sun-Gil, supra note 35. As Judge Arimitsu Toshiaki wrote, "Such conduct must
be said to be unforgiveable and illegal, even if plaintiffs were mobilized under the Citizen Conscription
Order. To that extent, old Mitsubishi Heavy Industries bears tortious liability. The company bears
compensatory liability for their tortious behavior for plaintiffs' mental suffering, putting aside the issue
of how much the award should." Id. at 67-68. Despite the court's claim that Mitsubishi bore
compensatory liability, it dismissed the case on the theory that today's Mitsubishi was a distinct legal
entity from the one that committed illegal and unforgiveable acts during the war. Id. at 81-82.
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perpetrate international human rights abuses, just as state actors and individual actors
may.101
In their rulings on forced labor cases, Japanese courts in effect have four
options to hold corporations legally liable---each with its own legal, political, and
moral implications. 108 At one end of the spectrum is negligence. Under this legal
fiction, the Japanese corporation owed a hypothetical duty to ensure the health and
safety of its charges, but violated that duty by failing to provide life essentials-food,
clothing, safe working conditions-to forced laborers. Under this theory, the
corporation is liable for an omission (not doing something) as opposed to a
commission, which somewhat softens the moral culpability of the corporation.
Courts have used negligence theory to find that corporations acted illegally on
109
numerous occasions, even when they did not order monetary damages.
Second, and somewhat more censorious, is joint liability. This addresses the
state-corporate nexus at the core of Japan's forced labor program. Joint liability
directs attention to the formulation, implementation, and intensification of Japan's
transnational forced labor apparatus. Japanese corporations made numerous requests
of the government for additional labor resources. In return, the Japanese government
passed laws and regulations to supply forced labor to the corporations. As many of
these corporations manufactured items directly (munitions, planes), or indirectly
(coal mines, hydroelectric plants), in support of the war efforts, one can question the
extent to which they acted of their own accord. Nevertheless, the treatment to which
they subjected forced laborers, and the refusal to pay wages, suggests the
corporations were not entirely blameless. Even when state actors rounded up the
laborers, either through Korea's colonial apparatus, or by seizing Chinese soldiers,
they often enjoyed direct or indirect assistance from Japanese corporations. These
judgments ascribe liability to state and corporate actors by framing the issue as "joint
107 Professor Koh identifies three steps in this norm diffusion process: (a) interaction, (b)
interpretation, and Ointernalization. First, a lawsuit, Senate hearing, treaty negotiation or other incident
forces government actors, from any branch, to take up a particular issue. Second, the government actor
produces an official interpretation of the particular issue. Third, after several possible interpretations
may be aired and debated, an official one is ultimately chosen and internalized. See Harold Hongju Koh,
Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599, 2645-46 (1997). Koh is quite clear that
courts are not necessary in any of the three steps. Id. at 2647.
108 A different statute of limitations applies to derelictions of duty (negligent liability) as opposed
to tortious actions (tort liability, joint liability). According to Professor Matsumoto, one does not apply
Article 724 of the Civil Code, with its relatively mechanical 20-year limitations period, in cases of
dereliction. Instead, one should apply Article 167, which states that the statute of limitations begins to
run "when it has become possible to exercise the right." This formulation permits courts to weigh
equitable considerations, such as fairness to plaintiffs, restrictions on traveling abroad, and efforts to
destroy or suppress evidence. See Matsumoto Katsumi t~ Sengo Hos ho Sosh6 no Shintenkai: Anzen
ni
ChUshin
wo
Mondai
Kikan
Joseki
Jila5
Oyobi
f!_a!ry_°-~-·· Gimu
~tfiJN'~ ~~a'fh'Jllit:j:li:,i;: [New Directions in Postwar Reparations
Litigation: Focusing on the Duty of Health and Safety and the Issue of Statutes of Limitation], 283
RITSUMEIKAN HOGAKU [RITSUMEIKAN L. REV.] 220, 226--27 (2002), available at
http://www.ritsumei.ac.jp/acd/cg/law/lex/02-3/matumoto.pdf.
109 The first decision to recognize the duty involved the Nishimatsu Construction Company (2002).
Since then, courts in Fukuoka, Kanazawa, Kyoto, Miyazaki, Nagano, Nagasaki, Niigata, and Yamagata
have all attached negligent liability to corporations. Morita Taizo, Chugokujin Kyosei Renko, Kyosei
Roda Sosh6: Sokatsuteki Kosatsu [A Comprehensive Account of the Chinese Forced Mobilization and
Forced Labor Lawsuits], in HOTEi DE SABAKARERU NIHON NO SENSO SEKJNJN [COURT ADJUDICATION
OF JAPANESE WAR RESPONSIBILITY] I I 8, 122-28 (Zukeyama Shigeru ed., 2014) (summarizing the
various configurations of tort liability Japanese courts applied in the fifteen Chinese forced labor
lawsuits).
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illegality." 110 Even when deeming this conduct "illegal," however, judges exculpate
defendants by resorting to various affirmative defenses. 111
Third, Japanese courts have also articulated corporate wrongdoing through
standard tort liability. The corporation violated plaintiffs' rights, and should
compensate them for the damage caused. Most decisions determine that the
corporation in fact committed a tort against the forced laborers. But a few decisions
that did not so find are discussed below.
A fourth measure oflegal liability involves the award of monetary damages.
This is, of course, the traditional victory for civil plaintiffs. Such awards are rare in
Japanese war reparations lawsuits, just as they have been in war reparations lawsuits
in other jurisdictions. In the United States, France, and-until recently-South
Korea, courts have immunized corporations from civil liability for their World War
II conduct due to treaty waiver, prescription (statute of limitations), or other
grounds. 112
Japanese judges thus chart corporate liability under various theories. The
questions then become which theory prevails, and why? Forced laborers seek
validation of key facts, legal theories, and acknowledgments of liability. They may
lose the case in the sense that the court did not order a damages award, or attach legal
liability. But moral victory can be adduced in many ways: (1) recognition of their
historical experiences as "facts;" (2) determination that the corporation broke the law
and violated plaintiffs' rights; (3) indication that the state is also liable under the
"joint liability" theory; (4) condemnation of the conduct in clear language; and ( 5)
suggestion that the plaintiff is due a remedy, even if the court does not order such a
remedy.
Even if indirect, the finding of tortious conduct matters. For many lawyers
involved in the war reparations movement, a judicial determination of illegality is the
main goal. 113 Domestic audiences across East Asia catalogue the extent to which
110
See, e.g., Niigata Chih6 Saibansho [Niigata D. Ct.] Mar. 26, 2004, 54 Stt6MU GEPPO 3444
("Zhang Wenbin v. Rinko Corp. & Japan") (holding state and corporation liable under both negligent
and joint liability theories); Kyoto Chih6 Saibansho [Kyoto Dist. Ct.] Jan. 15, 2003, 1822 HANREI JIHO
83 ("Liu Zonggen v. Nippon Yakin Kogyo Co., Ltd. & Japan") (holding state and corporation liable
under both negligent and joint liability theories); Fukuoka Chiho Saibansho [Fukuoka Dist. Ct.] Apr. 26,
2002, 1098 HANREI TAIMUZU 26 ("Zhang Baoheng v. Mitsui Mining & Japan") (holding state and
corporation liable under joint liability, but exculpating the state on sovereign immunity grounds).
111 Id.
112
In U.S. cases brought under the Alien Tort Statute, courts dismissed the claims as political
questions, time-barred, or resolved by postwar treaties. See, e.g., In re World War II Era Japanese
Forced Labor, 164 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1164-65 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (dismissing claims as untimely);
lwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d424, 491 (D.N.J. 1999) (dismissing claims as (1) time-barred,
(2) nonjusticiable political questions, and (3) international comity). In France, an administrative tribunal
ordered the French government, and the state railway, to pay damages to two French citizens transported
to an internment camp during the war. See Vivian Grosswald Curran, Globalization, Legal
Transnationalization and Crimes Against Humanity: The Lipietz Case, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 363, 364
(2008). However, the decision was ultimately dismissed by the French Supreme Court (Conseil d'Etat)
in 2007.
See French railways win
WWII appeal, BBC (Mar. 27, 2007),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6499227.strn.
113
See, e.g., Takahashi Toru, Liu Renjin Hanketsu no Seika to Eikyo [The Result and Influence of
the Liu Lianren Judgment], 362 H6 TO MINSHU SHUGI [LAW AND DEMOCRACY] 46, 47 (2001) (noting
that the lawyers' group in the Liu Lianren decision sought, inter alia, a court's acknowledgment of the
illegal nature of Japan's forced labor program); Zenkai Mitsuhiro, Chugokujin Kyosei Renk6, Kyosei
Rodo Jiken Fukuoka Saiban kara: Ayamachi wo Mitome, Tsugunai, tomoni Ayumu Ajia no Rekishi wo
[Chinese Forced Mobilization and Forced Labor from the Perspective of the Fukuoka Trial:
Acknowledge the Past, Compensate, and Walk Towards a Common Asian History], 624 SHINPO TO
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individual lawsuits authenticate disputed historical facts, advance theories of
114
liability, and characterize conduct by the Japanese state and corporate sectors.
These formulae matter because tort law has a moral component. On one level, tort
115
communicates the basic idea that defendant wronged plaintiff. In theory, these
permutations assess the culpability of various actors: drawing comparisons between
corporations and state actors, mapping the degrees to which each corporation was
involved, ascribing liability to state and corporate actors. This redistribution of
liability is important.
On another level, acknowledging the harm helps restore plaintiffs dignity.
Without a judgment (or other type of remediation), an unrighted wrong makes a
116
claim: "you can be treated this way, and that such treatment is acceptable." Tort
says otherwise--civilized society abhors such conduct, and sanctions those who
engage in it. This corrective aspect of tort law holds significance for many in the war
reparations movement. 117 Many Asians believe that Japan has not properly
acknowledged its wartime debt. Tort conveys some of the moral indignation that
plaintiffs have harbored for most of their lives.
A. NegligenceLiability

The duty of health and safety holds potential for holding multinational
corporations to account for a range of unfair labor practices. It implies, at a
minimum, a fundamental obligation to prevent torts of negligence-to do workers no
harm. 118 But it can also be read to impose more onerous obligations on corporations:
119
ensuring a basic standard of living for employees.

KAIKAKU [PROGRESS & INNOVATION] 39, 40 (2003) (listing recognition of illegal actions by state and
corporation as one of four "main elements" of the Fukuoka decision).
114
See generally Morita, supra note 109, at 122-28 (summarizing Chinese forced labor lawsuits,
including whether courts recognized the facts, which theories of tort were applied, and whether the
defendants were immunized). See also GUAN JIANQIANG, GoNGPrNG, ZHENGYI, ZUNYAN: ZHONGGUO
MINJIAN ZHANZHENG SHOUHAIZHE DUI RI SUOCHANG FALO JICHU [EQUALITY, JUSTICE, DIGNITY: THE
LEGAL BASIS OF REPARATION CLAIMS AGAINST JAPAN FOR CHrNESE WAR VICTIMS] 77-87 (2006)
(describing results of Chinese forced lawsuits). Sun Lei, Riben LU.shi Cheng Zhongguo Laogong

Susongan Jieguo Ling Ren Gandao Chiru [Japanese Lawyer Calls Result of Forced Labor Litigation
Shamefa[j XrNHUA NET (June 16, 2006), (noting the Tokyo High Court's recognition of the underlying
facts, and the "mass tort" of forced labor, in the Han Yinglin decision), news.sina.com.cn/c /2006-06
l 6/2l049223218s.sh tml. In the Han Yinglin case, forty-two plaintiffs sued ten Japanese corporations
and the government for forced mobilization and forced labor.
115
See Scott Hershovitz, Treating Wrongs as Wrongs: An Expressive Argument for Tort Law, 10
J. TORT L. 1, 2 (2017) (arguing that "tort is very much an expressive institution").
116
Pamela Hieronymi, Articulating an Uncompromising Forgiveness, 62 PHIL. &
PHENOMOLOGICAL RES. 529, 546 (2001).
117
See Catherine Pierce Wells, Tort Law as Corrective Justice: A Pragmatic Justification for Jury
Adjudication, 89 MICH. L. REV. 2348, 235 I (I 990) (arguing that corrective justice should serve as the
primary rationale for tort law).
118
Akpan v. Royal Dutch Shell, C/09/337050 (Hague. D. Ct., Jan. 30, 2013) (Netherlands) (holding
Dutch oil company liable for negligent tort, but not for infringing human rights, of homeowners whose
property was damaged by oil spill), English translation available at ENVIRONMENTAL LAW ALLIANCE
WORLDWIDE, https://elaw.org/sys tem/files/final-judg ment-shell-oil-spill -ikot-ada-udo.pdf (last visited
May 21, 2020).
119 Chandler v. Cape PLC [2012] EWCA (Civ) 525 (Eng.) (finding duty of care on parent company
to employee of subsidiary).
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Given the importance parties attach to tortious liability, the configuration of
illegality is also significant. State and corporate actors orchestrated the forced labor
program, committing numerous torts in the process. 120 Yet this theory of liability
focuses on what defendants did not do, namely discharge their duty of care. This
aversion may appear to reflect Japanese cultural preferences for indirection,
particularly when censuring powerful actors such as the executive branch. But a
more practical concern is Japanese law's prescriptive period (statute of limitations).
Japan's Civil Code provides for two prescription regimes, depending on
whether the tort is an illegal act (commission), or an act of negligence (omission).
For illegal acts (commissions), courts apply a 20-year statute of limitations in a
relatively rigid way. 121 But for negligent acts (omissions), the Civil Code permits
greater flexibility. 122 Article 166 provides for a 10-year statute of limitations that
starts when "it has become possible to exercise the right." 123 In other words, if
plaintiffs can show good reason why they could not exercise the right, courts will
suspend prescription, even for half a century.
For this reason, lawyers rely on both intentional and negligent theories of
liability. In using the legal fiction of negligence, judges steer away from the acts of
abduction and enslavement, and toward the corporation's poor treatment oflaborers
under their supervision. 124 Functionally, tortfeasors can be ordered to pay damages
under tort or negligence theories, or both. But the framing-whether one actively
harmed another (tort), or failed to fulfill an obligation toward another (negligence}
expresses judgment on defendant's culpability, intent, and even morality.
Negligence sends a weaker message of wrongdoing than does an intentional tort.

120
Torts include, at a minimum, the state's planning and execution of forced labor programs in
China and Korea, as well as the various state apparati (Army, North China Labor Association, public
schools in Korea) by which Japan mobilized Chinese and Korean labor. Corporations falsely imprisoned
forced laborers; subjected them to terrible working conditions; failed to offer adequate housing, clothing
and food; and used violence or murder to control forced laborers. See generally Webster, Discursive
Justice, supra note 23, at 201-211 (discussing various tort theories that Japanese courts applied to war
reparations lawsuts).
121
For example, the Nagano District Court determined that Chinese forced laborers had until the
end of December, 1965-twenty years after leaving Japan as forced laborers-to file their lawsuits. See
Nagano Chiho Saibansho [Nagano Dist. Ct.] Mar. 10, 2006, no. 1931, 109 HANREI JIHO [HANJJ] 49,
("Cang Xinshu v. Kajima Const. Case") (applying article 724(2) of the Civil Code to dismiss claims as
time-barred) (on file with Stanford Journal oflnternational Law). Needless to say, this expectation defies
various political realities: (I) Japan and China did not have diplomatic relations in 1965, rendering travel
from China to Japan extremely difficult, (2) Chinese citizens could not freely travel abroad until China
passed the Law on the Control of Exit and Entry of Citizens in 1986, and (3) evidence of the many torts
at issue in these cases was greatly expanded in the 1990s, as Japanese scholars scoured archives and
libraries to document the country's wartime past.
122
See Matsumoto Katsumi, Minp6 724-j6 K6dan no 'Fuh6 K6i no Toki' to Kenri Koshi Kan6sei
['Time ofthe Tort' in Article 724(b) of the Civil Code and the Possibility ofExercising the Right}, 307
RITSUMElKAN HOGAKU [RITSUMEIKAN L. REV.] 718, 745 (2006) (arguing that the more flexible
approach of Article 166 should apply to the limitations period prescribed in Article 724), available at
ritsumei.ac.jp/acd/cg/law/lex/06-3/matsumoto.pdf.
123
Minpo [Civil Code], art. 166(1) (emphasis added).
124
Japanese judges are not alone in this regard. In many corporate human rights litigation outside
of the United States, victims allege the corporation breached a duty of care it owed them. See Richard
Meeran, Tort Litigation against Multinational Corporations for Violations of Human Rights: An
Overview ofthe Position Outside the United States, 3 CITY U. HONG KONG L. REV. I, 3 (2011). Meeran
has tried numerous cases in English courts against MNCs for their acts in numerous foreign-non
English--fora.
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1. Duty ofHealth and Safety

The duty of health and safety imposes obligations on employers, real or
constructive. 125 It derives from a theory of workplace relations first articulated by the
Supreme Court ofJapan in 1975. 126 In that case, a soldier died during his professional
duties, performing maintenance on a military vehicle. 127 His bereaved parents sued
Japan, arguing that the state, as their son's employer, failed to provide a safe working
environment. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that the state, like any employer,
bears "a duty of consideration to protect civil servants from dangers to life, health
and other things." 128
The duty arises when two parties share "special social contacts based on a
legal relationship." 129 One incidental duty flowing from this relationship is the
"obligation to act in good faith towards the other." 130 Subsequent case law has
expanded the type of actor, to include private-sector employers, 131 and the type of
harm. 132 A recent decision suggests Japanese companies may need to ensure their
employers work in an environment conducive to maintaining mental health. 133 The
contours of the duty have broadened with time. In the war reparations lawsuits,
judges look backward, refashioning the duty to elucidate the legal interrelationships
among state, corporate, and individual actors during the World. 134

125
The term ~(anzen hairyo gimu) translates literally as a "duty to consider [someone's]
safety." To distinguish this narrower conception from the duty of care commonly discussed in standard
tort (duty, breach, causation, damages), I call it the "duty of health and safety." See also Jun Nakagawa
& Peter Blanck, Future of Disability Law in Japan: Employment and Accommodation, 33 LoY. L.A.
INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 173 (2010). These authors translate it as the "incidental obligation to consider
employee's health and safety." Id. at 180. I prefer the simpler "duty of health and safety."
126
Saiko Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Feb. 25, 1975, 27 SAIK.0 SAIBANSHO MINH HANREISHU [MINSHO]
43 ("Jieitai Case").
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 Id.
130
Id. The court describes the obligation to act in good faith as either unilateral (employer owes it
to employee) or bilateral (both employee and employer owe it to each other). Id. In the context of forced
labor, the obligation is generally thought to be unilateral, extending from the defendant to the plaintiff.
131
Saiko Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 10, 1984, 1116 HANREI HHO 33 ("Kawayoshi Incident")
(holding private company liable for violation of duty of safety when its equipment malfunctioned and
hurt an employee).
132
See Saiko Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 27, 2004, 58 SAIKO SAIBANSHO MINH HANREISHO
[MINSHO] MINSHO 1032 ("Yamamoto v. Japan") (holding state liable for failing to provide stricter work
force protections for coalminers).
133
See Saiko Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Mar. 24, 2000, 779 R6o6 HANREI 13 ("Oshima v. Dentsu")
(holding advertising agency liable for suicide of employee depressed from working too much). See also
Supreme Court rules Dentsu responsible for man's suicide, JAPAN TIMES, Mar. 25, 2000).
134
While most Japanese courts have applied this theory to find corporate liability, a couple of
exceptions can be noted. In 1999, the Hiroshima District Court refused to retroactively apply the duty,
first articulated in 1975, to conduct from World War II. Hiroshima Chih6 Saibansho [Hiroshima Dist.
Ct.] Mar. 25, 1999, unpublished opinion ("Park Chan-hwan et al. v. Mitsubishi Heavy Ind. & Japan"),
slip opinion available at justice.skr.jp/judgements/41-1.pdf. In 2003, the Tokyo District Court rejected
the duty on the grounds that no "special relations" had formed between the Chinese laborers and the
Japanese companies that used their forced labor. See Liv. Hazama, supra note 19.
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2. Cases against the Japanese Government
At first glance, the duty of health and safety seems an odd fit for war
reparations. Unlike the Supreme Court cases discussed above, forced laborers rarely
signed formal work contracts with the corporation. Instead, many were forcibly
abducted from mainland Asia, and trafficked to Japan. It was unclear whether these
actions created the necessary "legal relations" upon which to create a duty, as was
alleged in several lawsuits against the state. 135 But Japanese courts inoculated the
executive branch on sovereign immunity grounds (kokka mutoseki), statutes of
limitation, or treaty waiver. 136 For the first decade of litigation (1991-2001 ), state and
corporate defendants alike were nearly invulnerable. That changed in 2001, when
the Tokyo District Court rendered two separate decisions against the Japanese
government. 137
In Liu Lianren, the Tokyo District Court rendered its first decision against
the Japanese government for wartime forced labor. 138 Because the Showa Mining
Company, which had pressed Liu into forced labor in 1944 and 1945, had dissolved
after the war, the Japanese government remained as the sole defendant. Liu fled the
mine a few weeks before the end of the war, and hid in the mountains of Japan for 13
years. The court held that the Japanese government should have tracked Liu down,
and repatriated him to China. 139 The failure to do so meant the government abrogated
its "duty to rescue." 140 Under this legal fiction, the government of Japan incurred a
peculiar form of liability: not for abducting Liu in China, forcibly transporting him
to Japan, or rendering him to a corporation that enslaved him. Instead, the
government incurred liability for the thirteen-year period after the War, when his
location was unknown. 141
In Ukishima Maru, the Tokyo District Court determined Japan violated its
duty of care to a group of returning forced laborers. 142 On August 22, 1945, just a
week after the war ended, thousands of Koreans boarded the Ukishima Marn, bound

135
To be sure, this was one of many claims plaintiffs put forward. Others included international
law violations, constitutional violations, statutory violations, tort violations, and legislative omissions
Uudicial "suggestions" that the Diet should pass a low. See Kim Hak-Sun v. Japan, supra note 89; Tokyo
Chiho Saibansho [Toyko Dist. Ct] Nov. 22, 1996, unpublished opinion ("Kim Kyeong-seok v. Japan"),
slip opinion available at justice.skr.jp/judgements/18-1.pdf.
136
See, e.g., Kim Hak-Sun, supra note 89 (dismissing suit brought by 42 "Pacific War victims"
from Korea on sovereign immunity grounds); Kim Sun-Gil, supra note 35 (dismissing suit on statutes of
limitation).
137
The change in judicial behavior may reflect the individual predispositions of the judges involved
in the decision. One commentator hypothesized that the Japanese judiciary is reconsidering its national
interests in light of a rising China and more dynamic Asia. See William Gao, Note, Overdue Redress:
Surveying and Explaining the Shifting Japanese Jurisprudence on Victims' Compensation Claims, 45
CO LUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 529 (2008). My inclination is that Japanese judges grew habituated to hearing
war reparations lawsuits, and came to decide cases on their equities, even if that clashed with strictly
legal interpretations.
138
Tokyo Chiho Saibansho [Tokyo Dist. Ct.] July 12, 2001, 1067 HANREI TAIMUZU 116, 119 ("Liu
Lianren
v.
Japan"),
available
at
www.ne.jp/asahi/suopei/net/3_saiban/5 _renko/saiban_renko_tisai_hanketsu_ all.htm.
139 Id.
140 Id.
141 Id.
142
Kyoto Chih6 Saibansho [Kyoto Dist. Ct.] Aug. 23, 2001, 1772 HANREI JJH6121 ("Yang Sun
im ~lli'.iffv. Japan"), slip opinion available at justice.skr.jp/judgements/21-1.pdf. Id. at 24-25.
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for Busan, Korea. Two days later, the ship struck a mine left by the U.S. Navy, killing
524 Koreans and 25 Japanese seamen. 143 The court assigned liability to Japan under
the theory that it failed to ensure the safe passage of forced laborers back to the
Korean peninsula. 144 As in Liu Lianren, the court attached liability for postwar
145
In sum,
conduct. It also framed the tort as one of omission, not commission.
indirect theories have proven partially successful in cases against the government.
3. Cases against Japanese Corporations

With these precedents in mind, we now turn to cases against Japanese
corporations. It was hardly assured that the duty of health and safety provided the
doctrinal weight needed to attach civil liability. 146 Early decisions described the duty
147
This
as "general and abstract," not one that imposed concrete obligations.
particular interpretation lost credence after the Liu Lianren and Ukishima Marn
decisions clarified what the duty entails. Other courts dismissed the duty of health
and safety on formal grounds. Without a formal labor contract between the laborers
and the corporation, or a voluntary intention to work, courts rejected the idea that a
"legal relationship" had formed. 148 Without that foundation, judges could not address
whether the parties had established the necessary "social contacts" that underlie the
duty. 149 Plaintiffs argued that Japanese corporations formed the necessary "legal
relations" when they sent labor requests to the North China Labor Association. 150 As
discussed below, this argument ultimately proved successful. But early decisions
found no "third-party beneficiaries" explicitly listed in the contract, so the forced
laborers could not assert their rights to claim compensation. 151
An additional barrier was the statute of limitations. 152 While the length of
time varies with the filing of each individual lawsuit, the half-century or so between

143
The passenger ship struck an American naval mine on August 24, 1945, just nine days after
Japan's surrender. Id at 2-3.
144
Id. at 24-25.
145
The other major war reparations decision against the Japanese government involved three
Korean comfort women. In 1998, a trial court determined that the current Japanese government had
failed to pass appropriate legislation (ripp6 fusakui) to compensate the women. See, Yamaguchi Chi ho
Saibansho [Yamaguchi Dist. Ct.] Apr. 27, 1998, 1642 HANREI JIHO 24 ("Ha Sun-nyo v. Japan"), slip
opinion available at justice.skr.jp/judgements/26-1; overruled by Hiroshima Koto Saibansho [Hiroshima
H. Ct.] Mar. 29, 2001, 1081 HANREI TAIMUZU 91 ("Ha Sun-nyo v. Japan"), slip opinion available at
justice.skr.jp/judgements/26-2. Nonetheless, the trial court decision made history and headlines by
ordering the Japanese government to pay a small damages award to the women.
146
Arguably, the first decision to find a corporation civilly liable was Kim v. Nihon K6kan. But
the court found that plaintiff's right to bring a claim against the company extinguished in October 1953.
Kim v. Nihon Kokan, supra note 90, slip opinion at 58-59.
147
See, e.g., Park Chan-hwan v. Mitsubishi Heavy Industry, supra note 134, slip opinion at 181.
See also Kim Kyeong-Soek, supra note 135, slip opinion at 85.
148
See, e.g., Tokyo Chih6 Saibansho [Tokyo Dist. Ct.] Dec. 10, 1997, 988 HANREI TAIMUZU 250
("Geng Zhun v. Kajima Construction Co.").
149
Id. at 254.
150
Id at 255.
151 Id
152
Japan has various statutes of limitations built into its Civil Code. For dereliction of duty cases,
one must bring the claim with ten years of the emergence of the duty. Minp6 [Civil Code], art. 167
(Japan). For tort cases, one must bring the case within 20 years of the infringement. Minp6 [Civil Code],
art. 724(b) (Japan).
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the end of the war (1945), and the initiation of these lawsuits (1991-2015), is often
fatal to plaintiffs' suits. For this reason, plaintiffs' attorneys call the statute of
limitations the "wall of time," an insurmountable hurdle for their cause of action. 153
Yet in a handful of decisions, courts employed equitable tolling doctrines to avoid
this result. According to a 1998 Supreme Court decision, judges must apply statutes
of limitations in a manner consistent with "principles ofjustice and fairness." 154 If a
tortfeasor conceals information about its culpability, preventing plaintiff from
discovering relevant information, a court can reject the prescription defense. 155
In 2002, a Japanese court found a corporation liable for violating the duty of
health and safety for the first time. 156 Yet it did not order compensation. 157 Instead,
it took an incremental step towards corporate legal liability by articulating a theory
of liability, a juristic trail of bread crumbs that future judges may follow. Later, the
appellate court seized on this theory to order Nishimatsu Construction to pay
monetary damages to plaintiffs. Both trial and appellate decisions are analyzed in
tum.
The Hiroshima District Court had to confront the absence of contractual
relations between the Nishimatsu Construction Company and five Chinese forced
laborers. 158 The court analogized away this formalistic-yet previously fatal
obstacle in the following way:
There were no direct contractual relations between Nishimatsu and the
Chinese laborers. Yet, pursuant to a contract between Nishimatsu and the
North China Labor Association, Nishimatsu chose the site where the laborers
worked; it provided facilities and equipment to manage the site; it was
responsible for separating the Chinese laborers from the general population
of Japanese workers. In supervising the Chinese laborers, Nishimatsu had
complete control over their daily lives. Thus the relationship between
Nishimatsu and the Chinese laborers should be considered a legal relation,
similar to the special employment contract between Nishimatsu and the
NCLA.159
Having found the necessary "legal relationship" between the parties, the
court then located the "special social contacts" necessary for the duty of health and
safety:

153 See Chugokujin Senso Higai Baisho Seikyli Jiken Bengodan [Lawyers' Committee to
Compensate Chinese War Victims], Sajo no ShOheki: Chugokujin Sengo Hosho Saiban I 0-nen no Kiseki
[Barriers of Sand: 10 Years of Chinese War Reparations Trials] 239-241 (2005) (explaining Japanese
statutes of limitations principles).
154 Saiko Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] June 12, 1998, 52 MfNSHO I 087.
155 Id.
156 See Morita, supra note 109, at 124 (noting this decision was the first war reparations lawsuit to
recognize a violation of the duty of health and safety).
151 Id.
158 Hiroshima Chiho Saibansho [Hiroshima Dist. Ct.] July 9, 2002, 11 IO HANREI TAIMUZU 253
("Song Jixiao v. Nishimatsu Const. Comp."), slip opinion available at justice.skr.jp/judgements/54
1.pdf.
159 Id. at 210-11.
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Nishimatsu, based on a legal relationship in the special employment
contracts it had with NCLA, bore a duty of health and safety toward the
Chinese laborers. The specific contents of that duty included (a) housing
appropriate to the habits of Chinese people, (b) amounts of food (grains,
beans, vegetables, meat, miso, oil, etc.) necessary for physical labor, (c)
daily necessities as used by the average person, and (d) basic hygiene and
medical treatment. At the very least, the duty required Nishimatsu to provide
labor conditions so as not to harm the life or bodily integrity of the Chinese
laborers. 160
Despite this rather elaborate explanation of legal liability, the trial court
denied compensation by invoking the statute of limitations. The ten-year statutory
period in which plaintiffs should have brought a suit based on dereliction ended in
1955, ten years after their return to China. 161 This too is common in war reparations
lawsuits-an incremental change in legal interpretation that does not affect the
present outcome, but may do so later. 162
The Hiroshima High Court reversed, ordering Nishimatsu to pay each
plaintiff¥5.5 million ($50,000). 163 Under Japanese law, the court held, the statute of
limitations must be applied "in good faith." 164 Accordingly, as Judge Suzuki
Toshiyuki put it, "it is clear that exempting Nishimatsu from compensatory liability
due to the statute of limitations would egregiously violate the principles of justice
and fairness." 165 The court specified circumstances that rendered such a defense
unfair: plaintiffs' penury, the lack of travel freedom under P.R.C. law, China's
postwar political turmoil and civil war, and the lack of diplomatic relations between
China and Japan. 166 Accordingly, the court penetrated the venerable, now vulnerable,
"wall of time."
Regarding the duty of health and safety, the appellate court acknowledged
the absence of direct contractual relations between Nishimatsu and the forced
laborers. But it also noted that Japanese industry groups requested the government
"import" Chinese labor in the first place. 167 And it specifically cited Nishimatsu's
contract with the North China Labor Association to purvey some 360 Chinese
168
Moreover, the
laborers, meaning there was a contract, just not with the laborers.
contract indicated that N ishimatsu would receive the laborers in Qingdao, China, and
then transport them to a work site in Yasuno, Japan. 169 Nishimatsu further agreed to
bear transportation costs, which shows that Nishimatsu engaged in human trafficking,
and not just forced labor. While at the work site, Chinese laborers worked under the

160

Id. at 211.
Id. at 216.
162
For instance, several courts refused to apply the doctrine of sovereign immunity against the
government. Yet, these same judges exculpated the government on alternative grounds, such as statutes
of limitations.
163
Song Jixiao v. Nishimatsu Const. Comp., supra note 17.
164
Id., slip opinion at 13.
16s Id.
161

166
167
168
169

Id. at 13-15.
Id. at 51.
Id.

See id.
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direct supervision ofNishimatsu. Accordingly, even ifno contract linked the laborers
and Nishimatsu, their relationship resembled that of employer-employee. 170
The duty of health and safety provides a meaningful, if incomplete, account
of wartime forced labor. Early decisions found that Japanese corporations bore no
duty because no contractual relations linked forced laborers and corporations. But
once the Tokyo District Court found the Japanese government liable under a
negligence theory in Liu Lianren (where the corporation had dissolved), other courts
looked anew at the duty. 171 Over time, most courts held the corporation liable under
a duty theory. On the one hand, this provides a less compelling account of the severity
of the harm visited upon forced laborers, focusing attention on the failure to act, and
arguably distracting from the brutality which it engaged. Yet as several decisions
make clear, a corporation can incur various forms of tort liability theories. 172 And if
the duty of care provided the bridge to liability, plaintiffs and lawyers alike were
happy to traverse it.
B. Joint Liability: Connecting the Corporation and State
Japanese state and corporate actors orchestrated and implemented the
wartime forced labor program. Since each corporation varied in its degree of
involvement, generalizations about corporate complicity are somewhat difficulty to
draw. But the state played a relatively constant role: passing laws and regulations to
institute forced labor programs, planning and executing the conscription and
abduction of Korean and Chinese forced laborers, deploying state actors to recruit
them, and finally transporting them to worksites in Japan. Corporations, for their
part, played variegated roles: some requested the forced labor program ab initio;
others made requests for individual laborers from the state; still others engaged in
their own recruitment and transportation activities. Still, joint liability identifies the
responsible parties for the underlying tort, even if courts attach liability in somewhat
unpredictable ways.
Japan's tort law provides for joint liability. Article 719 of the Civil Code
provides, "If several persons cause damage to another person through joint illegal
acts, each shall be jointly and severally liable to compensate for the damage." 173 This
"narrow" definition applies when the plaintiff ascertains the identity of the

110
171

Id.

See Cang Xinshu v. Kajima Const. Co. et al., supra note 121 (finding state and four construction
companies liable under tort theory, but not awarding monetary damages due to statute of limitations).
See also Song Jixiao v. Nishimatsu Const. Comp., supra note 163. This was the first case to hold a
corporation liable under negligence theory. Later, the Supreme Court dismissed the case under the theory
of treaty waiver, essentially obviating the possibility of future damages awards. Saiko SaibanshO [Sup.
Ct.] Apr. 27, 2007, [missing case number] no. 1969, 31 HANREI J1H6 [HANH] ("Song v. Nishimatsu
Case"). For enlightened commentary on this case, see MARK A. LEVIN, INTERNATIONAL DECISION:
NISHIMATSU CONSTRUCTION CO. V. SONG ]!XIAO, 102 AM. J. INT' LL. 148 (2008).
172
See, e.g., Yamagata ChihO Saibansho [Yamagata Dist. Ct.] Feb. 12, 2008, [missing case
number] unpublished opinion ("Tan Yinchun v. Sakata Sea & Land Transport Case") (finding both state
and corporation had committed illegal actions under tort and negligence theories) (on file with Stanford
Journal oflnternational Law); Fukuoka Koto Saibansho [Fukuoka High Ct.] Mar. 29. 2006 [missing case
number] unpublished opinion ("Li Shu v. Mitsui Mining & Mitsubishi Materials Case") (finding
corporation had committed illegal actions under tort and negligence theories), available at
http://justice.skr.jp/judgements/73-1.pdf.
173
Minp6 [Civil Code], art. 719(1).
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tortfeasors. 174 In the war reparations lawsuits, plaintiffs have no difficulty in
remembering the corporations that enslaved them, even after a tumultuous half
century in both Korea and China.
Joint liability can attach to the party who incites the tortfeasor to act, or who
helps him commit the tort. 175 Rather than bifurcate joint liability into primary or
secondary, Japanese tort law holds both actors to account, in essence, as "joint
tortfeasors." In this way, courts sidestep a number of legal issues--color of law,
primary vs secondary liability, accomplice liability, aiding and abetting liability
that have hindered Alien Tort Statute cases in the United States. 176
In the war reparations lawsuits, joint liability nicely captures the
interrelationship between the state and private sectors. It does not equate their
culpability, but merely claims both acted illegally; they formed part of a common
tortious enterprise. In the broader discussion of war responsibility, discussions of
corporate liability have, until recently, been absent. These lawsuits thus help fill an
important gap in historical and legal interpretations of the war.
What does joint liability look like in practice? The Maebashi District Court
listed five distinct ways in which the two corporate defendants collaborated with the
state. 177 First, a trade association, comprised inter alia of the two defendants,
requested Chinese labor from the Japanese Cabinet in October, 1942. 178 Second, after
the Cabinet Resolution of November, 1942, high-level executives from the trade
association participated in the North China Labor Mission, an agency run by the
Japanese government. In this capacity, executives stood next to officials to design a
blueprint of recruiting forced labor. Third, the trade group made individual requests
of Chinese forced laborers from the Japanese government. Fourth, the companies
174
The "narrow definition" contrasts with the other situation envisioned in 719(1 ), when plaintiff
cannot identify the party of parties. For example, several companies might manufacture a harmful
product, but plaintiff cannot determine which company produced the one that harmed her. See
MATSUMOTO KATSUMI, SHINGAI KOISHA NO TOKUTEI TO KYODO FUHO KO! SEKININ NO SEIH1
[IDENTIFYING THE INFRINGER AND THE SUCCESS OF JOINT TORT LIABILITY), 333 R.ITSUMEIKAN
HOGAKU 1378, 1380 (2003), available at ritsumei.ac.jp/acd/cg/law/lex/10-56/matsumoto.pdf.
175
Minp6 [Civil Code], art. 719(2).
176
Historians, economists and legal scholars debate the extent to which the Japanese government
controlled the corporations, or whether the corporations exerted influence over the Japanese state.
Compare RANDALL K. MORCK & MASAO NAKAMURA, A FROG IN A WELL KNOWS NOTHING OF THE
OCEAN: A HISTORY OF CORPORATE OWNERSHIP IN JAPAN, in A HISTORY OF CORPORATE GoVERN ANCE
AROUND THE WORLD 367, 368 (Randall K. Morck ed. 2005) (claiming that the Japanese government
effectively "nationalized" many corporations), with W.G. BEASLEY, THE RISE OF MODERN JAPAN 191
(1990) (arguing the Japanese government lacked the "degree of authority" needed to ensure corporate
Japan acceded to the state's economic prerogatives); Yoshiro Miwa & J. Mark Ramseyer, Does
Ownership Matter? Evidence from the Zaibatsu Dissolution Program, 12 J. ECON. & MGMT. THEORY
67, 78 (2003) (arguing Japanese companies acted at the state's behest).
177 Maebashi Chih6 Saibansho [Maebashi Dist. Ct.) Aug. 29, 2007, unpublished opinion ("Wang
Junfang v. Kajima Construction Company Case"). For a description of the case, see KANAI Kon,
CHUGOKUJIN KYOSEI RENKO, KYOSEI RODO, GUNMA SOSHO: N!HON SEIFU TO N!HON KIGYO NO
KYOOO FUHO KOi TO HIGA! Jrmsu NINTEl [CHINESE FORCED MOBILIZATION AND FORCED LABOR,
GUNMA LAWSUIT: RECOGNIZING THE JOINT LIABILITY OF THE JAPANESE GoVERNMENT AND JAPANESE
CORPORATIONS), in HOTEi DE SABAKARERU NtHON NO SENSO SEKININ [COURT ADJUDICATION OF
JAPANESE WAR RESPONSIBILITY] 181, 188 (Zukeyama Shigeru ed., 2014). See also Chugokujin Sens6
Higaisha no Y6kyfi o Sasaeru Kai [Support Group for the Demands of Chinese War Victims], Ky6sei
Renk6 Gunma Sosh6: Maebashi Chisai Hanketsu Yoshi [Gunma Forced Labor Lawsuit, Summary of
blog.goo.ne.jp/harumi
2007,
7,
Sept.
Court],
District
Maebashi
by
Decision
s_2005/e/ecc83c4c79fdbb4b84a850be200564e0 (last visited Oct. 31, 2019).
178
See Kanai, supra note 177, at 188-89. The following summary of the verdict draws fiom this
article.
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sent their own employees to China to meet the laborers, and bring them back to Japan.
Fifth, the companies participated in the forcible transportation of the laborers,
knowing the Japanese Army prevented their escape during the trip to Japan. The
court concluded that,
Thus, Defendant Corporations, as noted above, did not simply participate in
Defendant State's decision to import Chinese laborers, they also cooperated in its
implementation. They send employees to the site, and brought plaintiffs and others
to Japan. In this way, all Defendants, working together, forcibly abducted plaintiffs
and transported them to Japan. 179
Joint liability underscores the collaborative nature of Japan's forced labor
program. Unlike the theory of negligent liability, which stresses the failure to do
something (omission), joint liability captures the active participation of state and
corporate actors. Joint liability has the additional virtue of assigning liability for
illegal activity, whereas the negligence theory applies a hypothetical duty of safety,
first articulated in 1975, to conduct that occurred decades previously. Joint liability
likewise attaches to wartime conduct. Japanese courts have often assigned liability
to postwar conduct, producing a halo of immunity around Japan's prosecution of the
war. 180 The joint liability theory disentangles the collaboration between state actors
(Cabinet, military, labor agencies in China, colonial bureaucracies in Korea), and
corporate actors (industry groups, forced labor sites in Japan, employees sent to
China to assist in trafficking).
C.

Tort Liability

Standard tort theory provides a straightforward route to corporate liability.
Most courts find corporations liable in the sense that they violated plaintiffs' civil
rights through false imprisonment, assault or forced labor. That may not be a
surprising result, but it is far from inevitable. On several occasions, trial courts did
not find the corporation liable. 181 By invoking the corporation's affirmative defenses
179

See Support Group for the Demands of Chinese War Victims, supra note 177.

° For example, the Liu Lianren decision attached liability for postwar Japan'sfailure to find and

18

repatriate the Chinese forced laborer. See Webster, Discursive Justice, supra note 23, at 348. Similarly,
in the Yamaguchi "comfort women" decision, the trial court attached liability not for the abduction or
sexual enslavement of the Korean plaintiffs, but in the current Diet's failure to remunerate or compensate
the women. Id. at 346.
181
See, e.g., Li v. Hazama, supra note 19; Park Chan-hwan v. Mitsubishi, supra note 134
(dismissing tort claim on statute oflimitations grounds, and the negligence claim on the grounds that the
duty of care is too abstract). The Li Wanzhong case is unusual for several reasons. First, it pitted 42
Chinese plaintiffs against 10 Japanese corporations and the government. Most lawsuits involve only one
corporate defendant, or occasionally two. Second, the trial court did not make factual findings or hold
that the corporations broke the law. According to plaintiffs' lawyers, the court was not interested in
hearing the facts of the case. The defendants contested the facts, placing the burden of proof upon the
plaintiffs. But the trial court only allowed testimony against two of the ten corporations. It then ended
oral testimony. Sumi Takeshi, Chugokujin Ky6sei Renko, Ky6sei Roda: Tokyo Dainiji Sosh6 10 Kigyo
to Nihonkoku wo Hikoku ni [Chinese Forced Mobilization and Forced labor: The Second Tokyo lawsuit
against Ten Corporations and Japan], in HOTEi DE SABAKARERU NIHON NO SENSO SEKININ [COURT
AOJUDICATJON OF JAPANESE wAR RESPONSIBILITY] 221 (Zukeyama Shigeru ed., 2014). In its decision,
the trial court invoked the 20-year prescription period to avoid a discussion of the merits of the dispute.
See Liv. Hazama, supra note 19, at 47-48 (dismissing tort claim on statute oflimitations grounds), and
58 (dismissing negligence claim on statute of limitations grounds). On appeal, the Tokyo High Court
made detailed factual findings, including observations such as the "forced labor in this case was ...
extremely evil, and the damage severe," and "such inhumane conduct is worthy of strong censure." Sumi,
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before reviewing the legality of its actions, trial court judges did not consider the
legality of the corporation's conduct. On appeal, however, Japanese High Courts
unequivocally held that the corporations violated the law, often using didactic
language to clarify the facts and legal interpretations. 182
I. Kim Sun-Gil v. Mitsubishi Heavy Industry

The second case brought against a Japanese corporation was filed by Mr.
Kim Sun-Gil (no relation to either Kim Hak-Sun or Kim Kyeong-Seok). 183 After
receiving a conscription order from Japanese authorities at his home in Pusan, he fled
to his mother's native village in Ulsan. 184 In January 1944, Kim was apprehended by
a Japanese policeman and Korean detective in Ulsan, and sent by military train back
to Pusan. 185 He was physically inspected by a Mitsubishi employee and a government
official-the first trace of the corporation's role in his abduction. 186 Mitsubishi staff
beat him, shaved his head, and held him captive for one day. He was then boarded
onto a ship, confined to a room guarded by five Mitsubishi employees, and trafficked
to Japan. 187 In Japan, he was transported by train, again confined to a single
compartment, to a shipbuilding factory. 188 He worked in the factory, which was
guarded by the Japanese Navy, until the atomic bombing of August 9, 1945. 189 Kim
then made his way back to Pusan. 190
The Nagasaki District Court dismissed Kim's claims, but not before
analyzing the legality of Japanese forced labor. 191 Judge Arimitsu Toshiaki started
from the assumption that the National Mobilization Law (1938) and National
Conscription Order (1939) were "constitutional and legal" under the old (Meiji)
constitution. 192 He noted Mitsubishi's collaboration in launching the forced labor
program, and the state's control over key sectors of the wartime economy:
shipbuilding, construction, and civil engineering. 193
at 226-27. It found the corporations liable under all three theories: negligence, joint liability, and
standard tort. But it still found plaintiffs' claims time-barred. Id. at 227.
182
See, e.g., Liv. Hazama, supra note 19 (Tokyo High Court made detailed factual findings and
recognized all three forms of tort liability after Tokyo District Court made no factual findings and did
not address merits of the case). Yi Jong-suk v. Fujikoshi, supra note 41. On appeal, the Nagoya High
Court made factual findings and assigned tort liability, even though Toyama District Court found that
plaintiff had not been forcibly mobilized and did not address legal merits. See Nagoya K6t6 Saibansho
[Nagoya High Ct.] Dec. 21, 1998 [missing case number] no. 1046, 161 HANREI TAIMUZU [HANTA] ("Yi
Jong-suk v. Fujikoshi Case"), slip opinion available at justice.skr.jp/judgements/23-3.pdf.
183
Kim Sun-gil, supra note 35. Kim filed on July 31, 1992. The next lawsuit-filed on September
30, 1992-targeted a Japanese corporation, Fujikoshi.
184
Kim Sun-gil, supra note 35.
185
Id., slip opinion, at 10--11.
186
Id. at 11.
181 Id.
188 Id.
189 Id.
190
Id. at 12.
191
The court determined that the current defendant, Mitsubishi Heavy Industry, was distinct from
the wartime corporate entity that used and benefited from Kim's labor. See supra note 64, and
accompanying text (explaining the corporate dissolution program overseen by SCAP during the
American occupation of Japan).
192
Id. at 63-64.
193
Id. at 64-65.
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Regarding Mitsubishi's liability, the judge held that Kim gave insufficient
evidence to show the five companions on the ship from Pusan to Nagasaki were
Mitsubishi employees. Accordingly, Mitsubishi was not liable for Kim's forced
transportation (kyosei renko) to Japan. 194 And while the conditions at the factory were
poor, they were not uncommon in Japan at the time. 195 In sum, Mitsubishi's treatment
of Kim was legal on the merits. But Mitsubishi did not avoid blame entirely. The
court delineated legal liability as follows:
As noted above, Plaintiff was effectively detained, subject to the supervisory
authority of the dormitory manager. He was also forced to work. This
behavior, even under the National Conscription Order, was both illegal and
unacceptable. To this extent, Mitsubishi incurred tort liability. Putting aside
the amount of the award, the company bears a duty to compensate for the
emotional harm that Kim suffered. 196
The court makes two important findings. First, it clarified Mitsubishi's
illegal activities: false imprisonment and forced labor. Second, it attached two
theories of legal liability: tort liability and the possibility of a damages award
(compensatory liability). In the end, the court accepted Mitsubishi's affirmative
defense that it is legally distinct from the entity that operated during the war. 197 Thus,
while the court did not order damages, even after noting "a duty to compensate,"
neither did it leave doubt on the illegality of Mitsubishi's actions.

2. Pak Chang-hwan v. Mitsubishi Heavy Industry
The second decision also involved Mitsubishi Heavy Industry. 198 The trial
court and appellate court evidenced two diametrically opposed views of the War,
perhaps a reflection of the ideological inclinations of the judges. The Nagoya District
Court held that the Japan-Korea Claims Agreement waived the plaintiffs'
compensation claims. 199 The plaintiffs' lawyer claimed that the trial court failed to
recognize the illegality of the conduct. To be clear, the trial court parenthetically
references forced labor, forced mobilization and forced confinement as the "illegal

194

Id. at 65.
Id. at 66.
196
Id. at 67.
197
During the postwar occupation, many Japanese companies were dissolved and then reformed,
with the explicit purpose of shedding their liabilities. Most Japanese courts have accepted this alter ego
theory and dismissed the case. The Supreme Court of Korea, however, has arrived at a different
conclusion, finding that the new and old companies were in effect the same. See Supreme Court [S. Ct.],
2009 Da 22549, May 24, 2012 (S. Kor.). An English translation of this article is available. See 2009 Da
22549, Issued May 24, 2012 (Supreme Court of Korea, I st division), 2 KOREAN J. lNT'L & COMP. L. 205
(Seokwoo Lee, trans. 2014).
198
Mitsubishi has been sued eight times in Japan, more than any other conglomerate (zaibatsu):
four suits against Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (shipbuilding, airplanes), and four against Mitsubishi
Materials (mining). See, e.g., Park Hae-ok v. Mitsubishi Heavy Ind., supra note 134.
199
Iwatsuki K6ji, Nagoya Mitsubishi Chosen Joshi Kinr6 Teishintai Sosh6 [Nagoya Lawsuit
between Mitsubishi and Korean Women's Labor Service Corps], in HOTEi DE SABAKARERU NIHON NO
SENSO SEKININ [COURT ADJUDICATION OF JAPANESE WAR RESPONSIBILITY] 287 (Zukeyama Shigeru
ed., 2014).
195
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activities in this case."200 But the opinion did not explain how the mobilization
(capture and abduction in Korea) or forced labor (in Japan) violated plaintiffs' rights.
Nor did the opinion delineate where the government's liability ended, and the
corporation's began.
The trial court portrayed the Japanese colonization ofKorea in benign terms.
Such a view reduces forced labor to a series of laws, regulations, declarations and
decisions-the number of "volunteers" recruited from each city within a particular
Korean province. 201 But the damage visited upon the laborers themselves was largely
elided. The following passage presents a very schematized version of Japanese
colonialism:
The volunteers in this case attended "citizen schools" in the late 1930s. In
those days, students conducted daily rituals to worship the Emperor. They
faced east and bowed to his "invisible majesty." They raised their voice in
song, chanting allegiance to the Emperor and his subjects. History class was
drawn not from Korea's past, but from Japanese myth. They were taught
"the Emperor is divine" and "Japan is a good country" . . . . They were
forced to memorize the Imperial Rescript on Education, and punished if they
forgot it. They were taught Kimigayo and military songs. Schools banned
the Korean language, and punished those who spoke it. 202
Many shibboleths of conservative Japanese nationalism appear, from
emperor worship and the national anthem (Kimigayo), to language politics and
disdain for Koreans. 203 Whatever its factual accuracy, the passage says little about
plaintiffs' experience as forced laborers, their abduction, or their treatment at
Mitsubishi's airplane factory. Given such an enthusiastic appraisal of Japanese
colonialism, it is no surprise that the trial court did not assign tort liability, in any
form, to either the state or Mitsubishi. Instead, the trial court accepted Mitsubishi's

200
Pak v. Mitsubishi (Nagoya Dist. Court), supra note 19, at 3. The trial court wrote "the actual
nature of the work plaintiffs performed at the Moral Factory of Mitsubishi Heavy Industry's Nagoya
Aircraft Manufacturing Facility amounts to forced mobilization, forced confinement, and forced labor
(hereinafter, in principle, "the illegal activities in this case")."
201
Id. at 4-5.
202
Id. at 5. During the period of Japanese colonialism, Korean children attended "citizen schools"
(kokumin gakk6), also translated "national schools"). These schools aimed to assimilate Koreans into
loyal citizens of the the Japanese Empire. See MARKE. CAPRIO, JAPANESE ASSIMILATION POLICIES IN
COLONIAL KOREA 1910-1945, 153-55 (2009). The Imperial Rescript on Education was promulgated by
the Meiji Emperor in 1890 to guide Japanese education policy. It was read aloud at major school events,
and commonly memorized by Japanese school children in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. The
volunteer corps (J: teishintai; K: jeongshin-dae) initially referred to various organizations (students,
farmers, housewives) mobilized to assist Japan's war efforts. Later, the colonial Japanese government
pressed hundreds of thousands of Korean men and women into forced labor (both manual and sexual)
under the rubric of "volunteer corps." See Chunghee Sarah Soh, The Korean "comfort women" tragedy
as structural violence, in RETHINKJNG HISTORICAL INJUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION IN NORTHEAST
ASIA: THE KOREAN EXPERIENCE 17, 23 (Gi-Wook Shin et al. eds. 2007).
203
See Hiroshi Fukurai & Jon P. Alston, Sources ofNeo-Nationalism and Resistance in Japan, 22
J. CONTEMP. ASIA 207-208, 210-211 (1992) (discussing the emergence ofnationalist symbols and rituals
such as emperor worship, the national anthem, and bias against Korean people and the Korean language).
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defense that it is now a distinct entity from the one that used forced labor during
World War II. 204 This was one of the many findings that plaintiffs appealed.
On appeal, the Nagoya High Court presented the war in a very different light,
starting with a reinterpretation of the state's conduct. It found that the Japanese
government, by recruiting underage Korean girls, violated the Forced Labor
Convention. 205 Japanese courts rarely find that the state violated international law, a
result that would in theory bring its own reputational sanction. 206 From here it was a
small step to hold the state liable. Indeed, the appellate court seems to instruct the
trial court about the legal violations.
These acts denied plaintiffs their individual dignity. Such flagrant violations
of justice and fairness, even under the laws and policies of the day, must be
recognized as unforgivable and illegal activities. Under Articles 709, 715
and 719 of the Civil Code, the state bears an obligation to provide
compensatory damages to the volunteer corps for forced mobilization and
forced labor. 207
Despite the strong rhetoric and the "obligation" to pay damages, the court
ultimately decided not to award damages, finding the Basic Treaty waived all
individual claims.
The High Court conducted its own examination of Mitsubishi's actions.
First, it overturned the trial court's conclusion that Mitsubishi was a distinct corporate
entity, reinstating a potential path to liability. 208 Second, it highlighted the various
torts Mitsubishi committed in abducting young Korean girls, and thence subjecting
them to forced labor. The judgment enumerated the "lies and threats" that Korean
school officials used to induce the girls to go to Japan, such as "you can go to school
in Japan," "you can make money while working in the factory," or simply "you can
make money,'' "if you study for two years while working in the munitions factory,
you can earn a diploma." 209 The court even noted the school principal's threat that
"if your parents break your contract, they will go to jail." 210 Such findings
demonstrate the extent to which ethnic Korean actors, including school officials,
participated in the forced labor program, something that Korean courts have largely
overlooked.
The appellate court spelled out that Mitsubishi used "forced labor" in no
uncertain terms, describing the grueling nature of the factory's conditions, lack of
food, restrictions on personal movement and communication with the outside world,
and failure to pay wages. 211 The court also clarified that Mitsubishi violated Articles
204
Pak v. Mitsubishi (Nagoya Dist. Court), supra note 19, at 32-43. During the U.S. occupation,
the Japanese Diet passed the Restructuring Act, which allowed many corporations to shed debt, to
rebalance their books, and to be reborn as new companies. However, as many of the same people were
in charge of both wartime, and postwar, entities, the issue of corporate identity has arisen in many suits.
205
Pakv. Mitsubishi (Nagoya High Court), supra note 19, at 18-19.
206
Webster, Discursive Justice, supra note 23, at 366.
207
Pak v. Mitsubishi (Nagoya High Court), supra note 19, at 19.
208
Id. at 22.
209
Id. at 15.
210 Id.
211 Id.
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709, 715 and 719 of the Civil Code, leaving no doubt about the corporation's tortious
liability. 212 1n the end, the court of appeals arrived at the same legal conclusion as the
213
But the
trial court: the Basic Treaty resolved all claims of Korean nationals.
appellate court made factual and legal determinations that the trial court judge did
not; it refined the factual record, and allocated legal liability to the proper defendant.
Tortious liability matters both to plaintiffs and defendants. 214 Plaintiffs seek
official recognition that they suffered a violation of their human rights and basic
dignity. Defendants assert that their use of wartime forced labor was either legal or,
given state involvement, legitimate. Courts may not attach corporate liability for
creating the forced labor program, but they regularly find the corporation's practice
of forced labor illegal. This has important normative and expressive features.
D. Damages Awards
The traditional victory for tort actions, in Japan and the United States alike,
is the damages award. Japanese tort law traditionally aimed to compensate victim
monetarily for the cost ofloss. Nevertheless, some Japanese scholars propose at least
two additional functions: sanction and deterrence. 215 As in common law jurisdictions,
sanction and deterrence sound in criminal law in Japan. But private law must also
sanction and deter. How else should a legal system respond to brutality, deceit, or
debasement uncaptured by criminal law? 216 Common law judges may impose
punitive damages when a party acts with malice or fraud. But Japan, as a civil law
country, does not recognize punitive damages, 211 limiting the extent to which tort law
punishes malicious acts. 218
Nevertheless, many Japanese scholars accept the idea that compensatory
damages can also serve both to sanction those who have committed wrongs, and to
deter others from doing the same. 219 Thus, courts may indeed punish civil defendants

212

Id. at 16.
In 1965, Japan and Korea signed several treaties to deal with issues left over from the war and
colonialism. Agreement between Japan and the Republic of Korea Concerning the Settlement of
Problems Regarding Property, Claims and Economic Cooperation art. 2(1), June 22, 1965, 583 U.N.T.S.
173 (noting that the states parties agreed that "problems concerning property, rights and interests of the
two High Contracting Parties and their people ... have been settled completely and finally").
214
Defendants, of course, do not want courts to determine that they acted illegally. See, e.g.,
Chugokujin Ky6sei Renko, Nagano Sosh6 wa Genkokugawa no Seikyit Kikyaku [Nagano Chinese Forced
Labor Case Dismisses Plaintiffs' Claims], YOMIURI SHIMBUN, Mar. 10, 2006 (reporting that defendants
at
available
tort"),
no
was
"there
argued
https://blog.goo.ne.jp/think pod/e/4dba3 7cc I d697656d70025238b8cl fUb.
215
HIRAI YOSH!O, SAIKEN KAKURON: FUHO KOi [THEORIES OF CREDIT CLAIMS: TORT] 5-6
(2008) (describing the "contemporary functions of tort law" to be compensatory, deterrent and punitive).
216
A case may not make it into a jurisdiction's criminal justice system for any number of reasons,
from statutes of limitation to political sensitivities.
217 See CARLF. GOODMAN, THE RULE OF LAW IN JAPAN: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 360 (2005).
218
Id. at 357, n. 979 ("In Japan, punishment ... is not part of tort damages. Tort damages are
compensatory in character and designed to reestablish the status quo and not to punish."). See also Dan
Fenno Henderson, Comparative Law in the Japanese Courts: Punitive Damages, 24 LAW JAPAN 98, 103
(1991) (analyzing a Japanese trial court's dismissal of an American punitive damages award as against
public policy).
219
The leading expositor of the view that tort also has sanctionary and deterrent functions would
probably be the late Shinomiya Kazuo, professor at the University of Tokyo. SH!NOMIY A KAzuo, FUHO
KOI: JIMU KANRI, FuTO RITOKU, FUHO KOi [TORT: OFFICE ADMINISTRATION, UNJUST ENRICHMENT
213
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through damage awards, a theory that has gained ground in recent decades. 220 The
idea of "punitive compensation awards" (seisaiteki isharyo) took root in Japanese
environmental litigation of the 1970s, 221 and human rights litigation of the 1980s and
1990s. 222
Damage awards theoretically remediate non-pecuniary harm, such as
physical and mental suffering. In calculating damages, Japanese judges enjoy broad
discretion to weigh both the conduct and malice ofthe defendant, as well as the extent
of the plaintiff's suffering, financial condition, profession, social status, age and
degree of contributory negligence. 223 Regarding corporations, compensation awards
disgorge profits made through illegal activity, such as pollution or the side-effects of
dangerous medications. 224 This motivation is also visible in the war reparations
lawsuits, where plaintiffs demanded corporations hand over unpaid wages. 225
Damage awards signal norm enforcement more potently than recognizing
facts or acknowledging legal liability. After all, one cannot order compensation
without also attaching liability and denying affirmative defenses. In the United
States, size matters; when a court orders a large award, it reflects an underlying
message about defendants' culpability. 226 But in Japan, damages awards are generally
much smaller, and less variable. Even so, the mere fact of monetary compensation
says quite a lot. Historically speaking, these may be the first decisions, if not the
first, to recognize the legal liability of multinational corporations for World War 11
era conduct. No previous judgments-whether from Nuremberg, Tokyo, or civil

AND ILLEGAL ACTS] 263-266 (1985). See also Hiromine Masako, Minji Sekinin ni okeru Yokushi to
Seisai (I) [Deterrence and Sanction in Civil Liability (l)], 297 RITSUMEIKAN HOGAKU (RITSUMEIKAN
L. REY.] 1223, 1242-43 (2004) (discussing Shinomiya's work on tort as a deterrent), available at
ritsumei.ac.jp/acd/cg/law/lex/04-5/hiromine.pdf; Mitani Hitomi, Fuh6 Kai ni okeru Seisai Gainen no
Juy6: Saikin no Seisaiteki Ishary6 SeikyU Ji'an wo Keiki Toshite [Accepting the Concept ofSanctions in
Tort: On the Occasion ofRecent Cases Seeking Punitive Compensation Awards], 53 SHIMANE H6GAKU
[SHIMANE L. REY.] 127, 142 (2010) (describing Shinomiya's work on tort as sanctionary), available at
ir.lib.shimane-u.ac.jp/en/joumal/L-SLR/53/4/article/7054.
220
Hiromi ne, supra note 219, at 1223.
221
Id. at 1228. For more on the "Big Four" environmental lawsuits in Japan, see FRANK K. UPHAM,
LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN POSTWAR JAPAN 30-37 (Harvard University Press, 1987).
222
See, e.g., Junko Kotani, Proceed with Caution: Hate Speech Regulation in Japan, 45 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 603, 613 (2018). In 2012, the Kyoto District Court awarded ¥12 million (US$120,000) to
a Korean school in Japan targeted by anti-Korean protestors. The court explained the large size of the
award---by Japanese standards-with reference to Japan's international legal obligations under the Racial
Discrimination Convention. Id. at 613. See also Timothy Webster, Reconstituting Japanese Law:
International Norms and Domestic Litigation, 30 MICH. J. INT'L L. 213, 217-221 (2008) (discussing
cases where Japanese courts ordered damages to victims of racial discrimination in public
accommodation); see also Timothy Webster, International Human Rights Law in Japan: The View at
Thirty, 24 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 241, 258 (2010) (discussing damages award in housing discrimination
case against ethnic Korean man in Osaka).
223
Mitani, supra note 119, at 154.
224
Id. at 155.
225
See, e.g., Kim Sun-Gil, supra note 35 (dismissing unpaid wages claim because defendant
corporation is legally distinct from the wartime company); Hiroshima ChihO Saibansho [Hiroshima D.
Ct.] Mar. 25, 1999, unpublished opinion ("Lee Geun-mok v. Mitsubishi Heavy Industry & Japan")
(dismissing unpaid wages claim as time-barred),available online at justice.skr.jp/judgements/41-1.pdf
226
Marc Galanter & David Luban, Poetic Justice: Punitive Damages and Legal Pluralism, 42 AM.
U. L. REv. 1393, 1430-1431 (1993) (suggesting large damages award can get defendant's attention and
enforce a particular message).
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227
of the l 990s-had held
suits from the Transnational Holocaust Litigation
228
corporations legally liable for their roles in the war.
Three judgments, of dozens rendered, ordered Japanese corporation to pay
229
damages to plaintiffs. The Hiroshima High Court decision appears above. The two
230
The small sample size cautions
other decisions also involved Chinese laborers.
against making sweeping pronouncements. But the fact that three cases involving
Chinese laborers ordered damages awards, but no cases involving Korean laborers
came to a similar conclusion, says something about current Japanese attitudes about
war responsibility. It could suggest that Chinese forced labor was worse-worthier
of compensation-than its Korean counterpart. Chinese laborers were often
abducted through violence, or were prisoners of war; few would reasonably say they
went to work in Japan of their own accord. By contrast, Korean laborers were
recruited pursuant to legal channels, such as the 1938 National Conscription Law.
Toward the end of the war, conscription became much more coercive in Korea, but
at least in its initial phases, as certain courts determined, Korean forced laborers went
to Japan voluntarily. 231
The jurisprudence on corporate legal liability in Japan's war reparations
litigation in effect splits the baby. On the one hand, courts made factual findings
about the corporations' various roles, often in conjunction with state actors, to design
and implement Japan's forced labor apparatuses. Judges repeatedly held this conduct
illegal under different legal theories. Importantly, even when trial courts rejected the
recognition of certain facts, or rejected different legal theories, appellate courts
usually reversed them on these points. Japanese jurisprudence thus details the
extensive collaboration of state and non-state actors, and provides legal paradigms to
explore individual corporation's legal liability for wartime forced labor. This should
not be overlooked. Many corporations denied involvement in the war crimes at the
core of these judicial inquiries. 232 And many corporate officers, even now, deny

227
U.S. courts tended to dismiss claims against European banks and corporations as time-barred,
political questions, or already resolved by international treaties. See, e.g., Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co.,
67 F. Supp. 2d 424 (D.N.J. 1999); Burger-Fischer v. DeGussa, 65 F. Supp. 2d 248 (D.N.J. 1999). On
occasion, U.S. judges endorsed settlement agreements that the U.S. executive branch had previously
negotiated with European governments. See, e.g., Jn re Holocaust Victim Assets Litigation, 105 F. Supp.
2d 139 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (approving $1.25 billion dollar settlement agreement between Swiss banks and
victims of "looting of personal and business property and slave labor"); see also In re Austrian and
German Bank Holocaust Litigation, 80 F. Supp. 2d 164, 180 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (approving $40 million
settlement against Austrian banks).
228
Since the South Korean Supreme Decision of 2012, South Korean courts in Busan, Gwangju
and Seoul have ordered Japanese corporations to pay compensation to Korean forced laborers. See, e.g.,
South Korean Court Orders Mitsubishi to Pay Additional Forced Labor Victims, KBS NEWS (June 27,
2019) http://world.kbs.co.kr/service/news_view. htm?lang=e&Seq_Code= 146217. South Korea top court
orders Mitsubishi Heavy to compensate for wartime labor, KYODO News (Nov. 29, 2018),
https://english.kyodonews. net/2018/11/2801 d6829d2d-urgent-s-korea-top-court-orders-mbishi-heavy
to-compensate-for-war-time-labor.html.
229
See supra, notes 164-171, and accompanying text.
230
See Zhang Wenbin v, Rinko Corp. & Japan, supra note 110 (ordering Japanese company to pay
¥8 million to each of eleven former forced laborers); Zhang Baoheng v. Mitsui Mining Co., supra note
110 (ordering Japanese company to pay ¥1.5 million to each of fifteen former forced laborers). I discuss
both cases at length in Discursive Justice, supra note 23, at 206--08 (discussing the Mitsui Mining case),
and 208-210 (discussing the Rinko case).
231
See, e.g., Tokyo Chih6 Saibansho [Tokyo D. Ct.] May 26, 1997, 1614 HANREI JIHO 41 ("Kim
Kyeong-Seok v. Japan Steel") (finding plaintiff was not forcibly mobilized to go to Japan); Shin Ch 'eon
su v. New Japan Steel, supra note 18.
232
See Sumi, supra note 181, at 222.
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responsibility of any type for wartime violations. 233 Prominent Japanese politicians
downplay the destructive role that Japan played in the war. Against these powerful
forces, Japanese judges on the whole agree that many of the country's most powerful
corporations violated the human rights of Korean and Chinese citizens.
On the other hand, the courts' ultimate failure to hold the corporations
legally liable, and to refrain from ordering damages, enfeebles prospects for
corporate legal liability. Of course, after the Supreme Court of Japan enshrined that
interpretation, lower courts would be expected to follow. In effect, we have a set of
roadmaps that lead to corporate liability, but few judgments that arrived at that
destination.
Ill.

EXPORTING JAPANESE CORPORATE CIVIL LIABILITY

Having identified several ways through which Japanese courts articulate
corporate liability, this section seeks to translate these lessons for other jurisdictions.
This is necessarily an imperfect endeavor. Some of what distinguishes the Japanese
experience of corporate civil liability inheres in its own legal system. Specific legal
theories may be possible-politically, legally or otherwise-in one jurisdiction, but
not the other. Despite the perils inherent in comparison, transnational dialogues are
at least imaginable.

A. Defining Corporate Civil Liability
Japanese judges consistently find corporate liability, even if they exculpate
the corporation on affirmative defenses. In the fifteen cases involving Chinese forced
labor, all ultimately found the corporation liable under standard tort theory, eleven
decisions found the corporation liable under "joint liability," nine for violating the
"duty of health and safety," and five under all three theories. 234 In seven cases
involving Korean plaintiffs, all seven cases ultimately found the corporation liable
under standard tort theory, but not all cases advanced other theories, such as the duty
of care.
The repeated mantra of corporate legal liability across Chinese and Korean
decisions supports the idea that corporations acted illegally, even if the court
ultimately accepts an affirmative defense and exculpates them. 235 Japanese judges
determine legal liability, irrespective of whether they attach it. This may reflect the
lingering influence of the inquisitorial system in Japanese civil litigation, which

233

See Webster, Price ofSettlement, supra note 5, at 340.
See Morita, supra note 109, at 122-128.
235
This contrasts with court findings against Korean plaintiffs. In Kim Kyeong-Seok v. NKK, for
instance, the Tokyo District did not find NKK liable under tort liability or the duty of health and safety.
Tokyo Chiho Saibansho [Tokyo Dist. Ct.], May 26, 1997, 1614 HANREI JIH6 4l("Kim Kyeong-Seok v.
Nihon Kokan"), slip opinion available atjustice.skr.jp/judgements/15-1.pdf. The court found NKK was
not liable for the Kim's abduction (forced transportation). Id. slip opinion at 48-49. The court also found
that Kim was not forcibly imprisoned while in Japan, but was instead freely able to come and go. Id. at
50. The company did, however, incur tort liability for the physical violence its employees inflicted upon
Kim. Id. at 58. However, the court exculpated the company due to Japan's 20-year statute oflimitations.
Id. at 58-59.
234
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expects judges to uncover the truth and apply the law accordingly. In so doing, this
determination fulfills the judiciary's role as arbiter of legality, and enforcer of basic
human rights protections. In calling such conduct illegal, these judgments contribute
to the idea of corporate civil liability, albeit incrementally. 237
It is not enough, however, simply to classify certain conduct as illegal. Like
other forms of law, tort has important expressive, corrective, and normative
implications. 238 The duty of health and safety-what I have termed negligent
liability-proceeds from the legal fiction that the Japanese corporations employed
forced laborers, in the sense that the laborers (a) worked voluntarily, (b) received
wages for their labor, and (c) enjoyed basic working conditions. We now know, in
part based on these lawsuits, that none of these applied to many forced laborers,
whether Korean or Chinese. Moreover, Japanese corporations committed far worse
than "negligence" to many Chinese and Korean laborers, as the deceptions, beatings,
killings, and starvations attest. Negligence theory evacuates the moral authority of
bothjudge and judgment.
Still, negligence theory has an advantage from the perspective of
comparative law: reproducibility. Many legal systems impose upon a duty to care
on employers. 239 In lawsuits related to work-child labor, slavery, human trafficking,
unsafe conditions-plaintiffs have a readily adaptable theory of liability. 240 The
importance of grounding international human rights norms in domestic law is

236 Thomas Weigend, Should We Search for the Truth, and Who Should Do It, 36 N.C. J. INT'L L.
& COM. REG. 389, 390, 396 (2011) (describing the judicial role in continental legal systems as enforcing

the law, creating the basis for a sound judgment, and uncovering the truth about an incident).
237 Alternatively, plaintiffs' lawyers interpret these cases as examples of Japanese "judicial
passivity." See lwatsuki, supra note 199, at 289.
238 See, e.g., Kenneth S. Abraham & G. Edward White, The Puzzle of the Dignitary Torts, 104
CORNELL L. REV. 317 (2019) (articulating a theory of tort that seeks to restore dignity to plaintiff); Jules
Coleman, Tort Law and the Demands ofCorrective Justice, 67 IND. L.J. 349, 357 (1992) (arguing for a
corrective role in tort law).
239 The common law began to imply "reasonable" duties on employers in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries. Roderick L. Denyer, Employer's Common Law Duty to Take Reasonable Care
for the Safety of his Workers: The Common Law and Workplace Safety, in INDUSTRIAL LAW & ITS
APPLICATION 47, 47 (Roderick L. Denyer ed. 1973). Leading common law decisions defining the duty
include Wilson's Clyde Coals v. English (U.K. House of Lords, 1938) ("The obligation is three-fold, the
provision of a competent staff of men, adequate material, 'and a proper system and effective
supervision ... "'); SAR & H v. Cruywagen (Supreme Court of South Africa, 1938) (imposing a duty to
provide safe working environment, safe equipment, and safe method of work). In civil law countries, the
obligation arises from general provisions of the Labor Code, and relevant provisions of the Civil Code.
In France, the duty of safety (obligation de securite') is enshrined in Article 4121 (formerly Article 230)
of the Labor Code (1906), and in the negligence provisions (Article 1147) of the Civil Code (1804). In
Germany, the duty of safety and health (Gewiihrleistung von Sicherheit und Gesundheitsschutz) is
sprinkled throughout various provisions of the Labor Protection Law (Arts. 1, 7, 8, 15-17), and Article
273 of the Civil Code.
240 The issue of forced labor has arisen in several ATS cases, such as Unocal, Nestle, and
Khulumani. In addition, courts in the United Kingdom, Germany and South Africa presided over lawsuits
alleging various workplace injuries. See, e.g., Mankayi v. Anglo-Gold Ashanti Ltd., 2011 (5) BCLR 453
(CC) (affirming worker's right to recover damages against mining company for occupational injury);
Lubbe v. Cape PLC, 2000 UKHL 41 (permitting South African worker to sue parent company in U.K.
for injuries he suffered at subsidiary's factory in South Africa). See also German Retailer compensates
Pakistan's 'industrial 9111 'families, DW, (Sept. 2, 2017), https:www.dw.com/en/german-retailer-kik
compensates-pakistans-industrial-9-l 1-families/a-37470138 (describing German lawsuit filed by
workers, and relatives of deceased workers, injured during a factory fire in Pakistan).
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discussed below. Here it suffices to note that the veins of corporate liability lie latent
in many legal systems. 241
The joint liability theory sends a different message altogether. On its own
terms, joint liability identifies the state and corporation as responsible parties. It
provides a more descriptively accurate account of the forced labor apparatus, and the
varied roles played by the Japanese army, Japanese agencies in north China, Korean
administrators and colonial officials, as well as Japanese corporations. At a time
when Japan's political leadership weaves various skeins to skirt war responsibility,
judicial attribution of legal liability to the state should not be taken for granted. There
is a widespread feeling among many in East Asia-Chinese, Japanese, and Korean
alike-that Japan has not accepted full responsibility for its conduct during the World
War 11. 242 The joint liability paradigm reconfigures the historical record so as to
highlight the state's role, and its complicity with major Japanese corporations, to
enact the forced labor program.
American judges handle similar problems in Alien Tort Statute litigation,
many of which allege corporations conspired with state actors to commit human
rights abuses. 243 The state-corporate nexus has prompted many American judges to
ponder a range of liability issues, such as whether international law or domestic law
controls the inquiry, whether international law recognizes secondary liability for
human rights abuses, how to define aiding and abetting under international law, and
so on. 244 Federal courts have also demanded that the corporation act under "color of
law." In other words, the state-corporate relation must be so close, and their actions
so tightly interwoven, that the corporation and state "share a common,
unconstitutional goal."245 But other lawsuits founder on the issue of whether
international law applies, whether secondary liability attaches to corporate actors, or
whether customary international law has crystallized standards for aiding and
abetting. 246 The query need not be so technical. Domestic law analogs, whether
241
See Youseph Farah, Toward a Multi-Directional Approach to Corporate Accountability, in
CORPORA TE ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE CONTEXT OF TRANSITIONAL1USTICE 27, 42 (Sabine Michalowski
ed. 2013) (describing the "narrow legal constraints" through which human rights violations must pass to
become colorable legal claims).
242
Jager & Mitter, supra note 76, at 4 ("Korean and Chinese memories of the Pacific War, and
continuing tensions over Japan's 'amnesia' about its wartime past, have led to a marked increase in anti
Japanese sentiments in these countries").
243
See, e.g., Khulumani v. Barclay Nat. Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 259 (2d Cir. 2007) (alleging
Barclay and other financial institutions aided and abetted human rights abuses committed by the
apartheid government in South Africa); Doe v. Unocal, 395 F.3d 932, 947 (9th Cir. 2002) (alleging
Unocal conspired with the Burmese military to forcibly remove and enslave local populations); Bowoto
v. Chevron Texaco Corp., 312 F. Supp. 2d 1229, 1240 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (alleging Texaco knowingly
provided substantial assistance to human right abuses carried out by the Nigerian military); Presbyterian
Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 289, 321(S.D.N.Y.2003) (alleging "Talisman
deliberately worked with Sudan to plan certain unlawful acts").
244
Because the ATS requires a violation of international law, courts do not necessarily consider
the extent to which it violates domestic law. See, e.g., Chimene I. Keitner, Conceptualizing Complicity
in Alien Tort Cases, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 61, 64 (2009) (arguing that international law, not domestic law,
should serve as the standard for accomplice liability in ATS cases); Khulumani v. Barclay National Bank,
504 F .3d 254, 297 (2007) ("[A] federal court must tum to international law to divine standards of primary
liability under the ATCA. To derive a standard of accessorial liability, however, a federal court should
consult the federal common law") (emphasis added) (Hall, J, concurring).
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See Nat. Coalition Govt. of Burma v. Unocal, Inc., 176 F.R.D. 329, 346 (C.D. Cal. 1997)
(citations omitted).
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In Khulumani, for instance, the Southern District dismissed the case because secondary liability
(aiding and abetting) was not available under international law. In a fractured appellate opinion, the
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drawn from U.S. common law or the law of the jurisdiction where the extraterritorial
tort took place, would be helpful in this regard.
When it comes to ordering compensation, many judges accept the following
247
affirmative defenses: sovereign immunity, treaty waiver, and statutes oflimitation.
But even when the opinion does not order damages, the judgments depict how the
corporation acted illegally. 248 This may be obiter dictum, but does not detract from
the point: judging World War II, and delimiting responsibility, remains as essential
in 2020 as it did over seven decades ago. The 2007 verdicts from the Japanese
Supreme Court precluded monetary damages. In response, Japanese lower courts
elaborated distinct modes of corporate legal liability. If a judge could not order
monetary damages, he would at least set straight the historical, legal, and moral
orders.
B.

Corporate Liability for World War II

A final reflection upon the state of World War II reparations is also in order.
For over thirty years, activists, attorneys, politicians, and survivors have made the
case for reparations in Europe, Asia and the United States. Domestic courts,
international courts, congressional inquiries, interstate negotiations, mock trials, and
specially-designated claims tribunals have presided over an enormous range of
wartime casualties. 249 A complete account of these activities lies beyond this article.
Instead, we drill down on the issue of corporate legal liability.
The contemporary reassessment of World War II has addressed many issues
overlooked during the postwar accountability exercises of Nuremberg and Tokyo,
including corporate liability. 250 During those trials, and for most of the ensuing five
decades, little attention was paid to the dark recesses of World War II: bank accounts
once held by Jews "lost" in Switzerland, art looted by Nazis in Austria, properties
seized by Vichy France, "comfort women," in East Asia and Southeast Asia, and
widespread systems of forced labor in Germany and Japan.

judges of the Second Circuit splintered, inter alia, on whether to apply federal common law or customary
international law, what the mens rea was for aiding and abetting (knowledge or purpose), and whether
the case should be dismissed on prudential grounds. Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 736, 748 (9th Cir.
2011).
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Most cases are dismissed on one of three grounds: sovereign immunity, treaty waiver, or statute
oflimitations. These too have a normative valence, and attach various modes ofliability to state conduct.
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This would include Liu Lianren, Yamaguchi "comfort women," and the Ukishima Mam
decision.
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Helpful accounts of the European and American strands of the reparations litigation
movement--{;ourt decisions, legislative hearings, claims commissions, and bilateral negotiations
appear in BAZYLER, HOLOCAUST JUSTICE, supra note 29; Bazyler and Alford, HOWCAUST
RESTITUTION, supra note 29; BILSKY, supra note 6, at 117. In 2012, the International Court of Justice
immunized Germany from civil litigation claims issued by Italian and Greek courts for war reparations.
See Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. Italy), Judgment (Feb. 3, 2012). In 2000, the Violence
against Women Worldwide Network (VAWW-NET) held a mock trial of seven Japanese war criminals,
including Emperor Hirohito. See Karen Knop, The Tokyo Women's Tribunal and the turn to fiction, in
EVENTS: THE FORCE OF INTERNATIONAL LA w 141 (Fleur Johns et al. eds., 2010).
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Jonathan Bush writes that the Allies explored corporate criminal liability at the International
Military Tribunal, but ultimately rejected the idea. Instead, the United States' national military tribunal
tried prominent industrialists from the Krupp, Farben, and Flick corporations. See Jonathan A. Bush,
The Pres history ofCorporations and Conspiracy in International Criminal Law: What Nuremberg Really
Said, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1094, 1239 (2009).
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In Europe, the Holocaust reparation movement led to the establishment of
historical commissions, specifically tasked with investigating wartime misconduct
by corporations and governments. For instance, the Bergier Commission showed
that Credit Suisse and United Bank of Switzerland (UBS) transferred funds from
accounts of murdered Jews to Germany, failed to return those assets after the war,
and then shredded evidence of their wrongdoing. 251 On one hand, these commissions
enrich our historical understanding by disseminating "public narratives of
responsibility about business participation in the Holocaust. " 252 On the other hand,
as Professor Leora Bilsky of Tel Aviv University argues, the European reparations
movement "did not produce a clear and precise norm of corporate liability for human
rights violations." 253
In East Asia, civil litigation has confirmed serious human rights violations
by Japanese corporations, as well as legal theories to hold corporate actors to account.
Lawyers, working with historians and activists, combed historical archives to piece
together the state-corporate collaboration behind the forced labor program. 254 The
judicial decisions then highlighted the roles that Japanese corporations played in
creating, maintaining, and covering up Japan's wartime forced labor apparatus. The
consolidation of legal theories, over the course of dozens of cases in Japan and more
recently Korea, embodies a norm of corporate liability missing from the Western
experience. This does not mean that Japanese corporations more willingly
acknowledge their legal liability. Rather, the lawsuits lay the legal groundwork for
a corporate liability norm.
Second, the Asian experience reveals the limits and advantages of a
litigation-based model of reparations. In the transatlantic context, political actors
promptly responded to a relatively limited number of lawsuits filed in the United
States, and certain European countries.
The negotiations of the Clinton
Administration, most notably those conducted by Ambassador Stuart Eizenstat,
produced agreements between the United States and various European states in just
a few years. While such diplomatic efforts produced a speedy resolution of the
underlying harms, the diversion of the dispute from U.S. courts to the State
Department precluded the development of legal doctrines that might also yield
compensation.
In Asia, litigation remains the predominant model of war resolution, itself a
reflection of the fragmented geopolitics of contemporary East Asia. In the absence
of serious engagement from outside actors (including the American, Chinese,
Japanese, and South Korean governments), Asian victims have resorted to
transnational litigation. Despite its failure to deliver damage awards or apologies
plaintiffs' main desiderata-litigation airs grievances, fleshes out the facts, and tests
theories of corporate and state liability. Each of these has important implications for
further developments of the rule oflaw, and the role ofredress, after serious conflict.
251
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Professor Kosh6 Tadashi found a trove ofdocuments about Korean forced labor in his university
library. Nippon Steel, produced its own report on the use of Korean forced labor. See Yamamoto
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[The Human Rights Violation of Unpaid Wages: The Nippon Steel Litigation and the Fight to Recover
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81, 82 (Kosh6 Tadashi et al. eds. 2000).
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At the same time, one cannot ignore the fact that a damages award-in the rare
instance when it is ordered-is unlikely to redress the depth and breadth of plaintiffs'
harms. In the final analysis, litigation can apply pressure to state and corporate actors.
But resolving matters as complicated as war reparations requires not just lawyers and
judges, but diplomats and politicians.
CONCLUSION

For over a quarter century, Japanese courts have articulated theories of
corporate legal liability for some of World War II's gravest human rights abuses.
These cases delimit the various roles that Japanese corporations played in designing,
promulgating, overseeing, and hiding a transnational forced labor program, and do
so with varying degrees of moral judgment. It is true that no corporations actually
paid a damages award, as the rare plaintiff victories were invariably reversed on
appeal. In the end, Japanese courts effectively immunized Japanese corporations.
The opinions tell a more nuanced story: outlining the roles that Japanese
corporations played in the forced labor apparatus; confirming facts of abduction and
abuse that corporations have denied elsewhere; declaring illegal a range of human
rights abuses still widespread in contemporary society; articulating ideas in the
"vernacular" of domestic Japanese law; and occasionally awarding damages for good
measure. What are the implications for the questions of corporate liability?
The war reparations lawsuits provide limited support to an emerging norm
of corporate legal liability. The judgments operate on multiple levels. They address
issues offactual liability, and articulate theories oflegality potentially helpful in other
jurisdictions grappling with corporate human rights abuses. The judgments
unequivocally find that such behavior is illegal, under domestic legal standards. They
do not, however, take the additional step of awarding damages and holding the
corporation legally liable.
Recent decisions in the United States, notably Kiobel and Jesner, suggest
that the judicial scope for corporate legal liability is shrinking. The Japanese war
reparations litigation shows the importance of judicial engagement with corporate
legal liability. Time will tell whether corporate legal liability crystallizes into a
predictable norm, or disperses into the dustbin of legal history.

